has become more inceptual and thus as something entirely different. has the strength to remain the same.
The other beginning of thinking inquires into the truth of be-ing.
*
[G300]Be-ing-historical thinking enthinks the truth of be-ing (openness of clearing) at first as 'time-space'. as that ground of the onefold of "time" and "space" that lets both time and space emerge in their mutual-belongingness as trajectories and expanses of 'removal-unto' of the clearing of ab-ground. However. insofar as it is "time" that at first manifests the onefold of 'removal-unto' more strikingly than 'space' — "space" also 'removes-unto'. not less but differently than "time" — the attempt to render the truth of be-ing (i.e., the "meaning" of be-ing) thinkable must start off from "time". Therefore. the nearmost unfoldment of the question of being that begins again stands under the title "being and time".
Here "time" names something that cannot be clarified by "merely" discussing the earlier and present concepts of time. Rather, here "time" names something that is predetermined in an incomparably different way by the question concerning the clearing of be-ing itself as the swaying that belongs to be-ing. Any detailed consideration of the "concept of time" can only have the limited task of elucidating that which arises out of the original time (which, incidentally, has not the least in common with [Bergson's] durée) and which by contrast, and without, of course, ever permitting a transition into the other "time". can serve to bring into relief that entirely other "time". The "time" that is launched in be-ing-historical thinking prevails already as the horizon — the perspective — which more specifically put is the uninquired and heretofore uninquirable horizon for the "presence" and "constancy" (οὐσία); for gatheredness (λόγος) and receivedness (νοῦς); for representedness (ἰδέα) and abjectness. whereby throughout the entire history of metaphysics being was determined in advance as beingness. And this "pers"-pective is the one that primarily, and as if by itself and out of itself (why and to what extent?), suggests itself to "thinking" (νοεῖν — λέγειν) so that, reassured in this perspective — in this horizon — and sustained by it, this thinking never needs to ponder on itself, but holds unto itself as the guiding-thread for determining beingness and [G301] its constitution. and in keeping with the self-understanding of