to say, on the basis of its thinkability. Yet Nietzsche neither says nor asks what kind of thinking it is that thinks the essential concept; nor docs he say or ask whether and in what way thought and thinkability may serve as the court of jurisdiction for the essence of beings. But perhaps he does not need to ask such a thing, seeing that all philosophy prior to him never asked such things, either. Of course, this is more an excuse than a justification. Yet at present it is a matter of setting our sights on Nietzsche's thought.

4. What results as an intrinsic consequence of the essential finitude of force? Because force, which is essentially finite, is the essence of the world, the totality of the world itself remains finite, indeed in the sense of a firm confinement within boundaries, a confinement that derives from being as such. The finitude of the world does not consist in colliding against something else which the world is not and which would function as an obstacle to it. Finitude emerges from the world itself. Cosmic force suffers no diminution or augmentation. "The amount of universal force is determinate, nothing 'infinite': let us guard against such extravagant interpretations of the concept" (XII, number 90).

5. Does not the finitude of being as a whole imply a limitation of its durability and duration? The lack of diminution and accretion in universal force signifies not a "standstill" (XII, number 100) but a perpetual "Becoming." There is no equilibrium of force. "Had an equilibrium of force been achieved at any time, it would have lasted up to now: hence it never entered on the scene" (XII, number 103). We must grasp "Becoming" here quite generally in the sense of transformation or—still more cautiously—change. In this sense passing away is also a becoming. "Becoming" here does not suggest genesis, much less development and progress.

6. From the finitude of the world we necessarily conclude to its surveyability. In reality, however, being as a whole is not surveyable; hence it is "infinite." How does Nietzsche define the relationship of essential finitude with such infinitude? We must pay special heed to Nietzsche's response to this question, since he often speaks of the "infinite" world when he is expressing his thoughts in less rigorous fashion, thus appearing to reject his fundamental assertion concerning the essential