In the foregoing we have attempted to portray Nietzsche's fundamental thought—the eternal return of the same—in its essential import, in its domain, and in the mode of thinking that is expressly proper to the thought itself, that is, the mode demanded by the thought as such. In that way we have laid the foundation for our own efforts to define Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position in Western philosophy. The effort to circumscribe Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position indicates that we are examining his philosophy in terms of the position assigned it by the history of Western philosophy hitherto . At the same time, this means that we are expressly transposing Nietzsche's philosophy to that sole position in which it can and must unfold the forces of thought that are most proper to it, and this in the context of an inescapable confrontation with prior Western philosophy as a whole. The fact that in the course of our presentation of the doctrine of return we have actually come to recognize the region of thought that must necessarily and preeminently take precedence in every fruitful reading and appropriating of Nietzschean thought may well be an important gain; yet when viewed in terms of the essential task, namely, the characterization of Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position, such a gain remains merely provisional.
We shall be able to define Nietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position in its principal traits if we ponder the response he gives to the question concerning the constitution of being and being's way to be. Now, we know that Nietzsche offers two answers with regard to being as a whole: being as a whole is will to power, and being as a whole is