NIETZSCHE'S WORD: "GOD IS DEAD"

and in which hierarchy of values they are posited within the essence [Wesen] of the value-setting will to power as the "essentia [Essenz]" of beings. The thesis runs: "Art is worth more than truth" (The Will to Power, no. 853, from 1887/88).

The ground-thesis of the metaphysics of the will to power is a thesis of value.

From the highest thesis of value it becomes clear that the setting of value as such is essentially twofold. In the dispensation of value there is set, whether explicitly or not, one necessary and one sufficient value; both, however, are set on the basis of the prevailing relationship of the two toward each other. This doubleness of the dispensation of value corresponds to its principle. The will to power is where the dispensation of value as such is sustained and directed from. Out of the unity of its essence, it both desires [verlangt] and suffices for [langt] the conditions for its own increase and preservation. A look at the twofold essence of the dispensation of value brings thinking expressly before the question about the essential unity of the will to power. Since the will to power is the "essentia" of beings as such, and since saying this is the metaphysically true, we will be asking about the truth of the true whenever we think about the essential unity of the will to power. With this question we arrive [gelangen] at the highest point of this and every metaphysics. Yet what do we mean here by the highest point? Let us explain what is meant in connection with the essence of the will to power in order to remain within the bounds set for the current examination.

The essential unity of the will to power can be nothing but this will itself. Its unity is the mode by which the will to power as will brings itself before itself. The unity places the will itself into the will's own examination. Moreover, it places the will before itself in such a way that it is not until the will is subject to this examination that it purely represents itself and therefore represents [repräsentiert] itself in its highest form. Here, however, representation [Repräsentation] is in no way a supplement to presentation [Darstellung]; rather, the presence [Präsenz] that is determined on the basis of representation is the mode in which and as which the will to power is.

Yet this mode, in which the will to power is, is at the same time the manner in which it places itself into the unconcealment of itself. Its truth lies in this unconcealment. The question about the essential unity of the will to power is the question about the nature of this truth in which the will is as the being of beings. At the same time; however, this truth is the truth of beings as such; metaphysics is as this truth. Accordingly, the truth now in question is not the truth which the will to power sets as the necessary

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