5. Beyng? | 13
“sublation.” For twisting-free is at the same time the original unfolding [Er-Wesung] of beyng itself in inceptedness.
In the twisting-free of beyng toward the incipience of the parting, beyng is both said and questioned, and it is thus that the holding-silent of its twisting-free into inception can take place.
The twisting-free of beyng includes the warrant for the more proper (i.e., more inceptive) question-worthiness of beyng. The twisting-free is not the devaluing of beyng but rather its ultimate acknowledgment. {GA 70: 22}
The twisting-free of beyng, itself an onto-historical event, is hardly to be confused with the apparent doing away with “being” by proclaiming “becoming.” Quite apart from [the fact] that this doing away with “being” is just a step of modern metaphysics, the doing away also only seems to be this supposed overcoming. In truth, what is accomplished here is the imprisoning of being, expelled into the unquestionable. The replacing of being by “becoming” (= life = will to power) is not only no overcoming of being, let alone a twisting-free of beyng. This replacing is merely the entanglement in beings, an entanglement that mistakes and at the same time betrays itself, in that it must necessarily set up “being” in the sense of the ensuring in constancy of “life.”
By contrast, the twisting-free of beyng encloses in itself the entrance into the intimacy of its essence as inception.
The twisting-free of beyng needs the pure telling of beyng itself. But the twisting-free is at the same time the safekeeping of beyng into the receding of parting.
This is why, in the telling of beyng, what is specifically said is not beyng but rather the event of inception, which can no longer be addressed as beyng.
The first-inceptive question of being asks about the being of beings, yet without ossifying into the question of “what” beings might be. In the manner of the first inception, being and only being is asked about, but at the same time, beings are what are named and thought. But the differentiation means nothing. Being is inquired after only in order to name itself, but here it is not initially being that is said but rather, and almost unwittingly, ἀλήθεια and then φύσις.
Since Plato, the question of being asks decisively what beings might be. The question of being itself, resounding in the first inception but not developed, is given up or, better said, is not known and so is admitted into no thoughtful reflection.
Now the question is about the essence of beings and about “essentiality,” which is then, once again, located in a highest being. {GA 70: 23} But if what is inquired into is the question of the essence of beyng, then what immediately reveals itself is how beyng recovers its proper truth and that this truth is itself determined as beyng. The beyng of beyng is, then, just the name for the inceptuality of inception, from out of which the twisting-free of beyng into the parting becomes necessary.