19. The Incipience of Inception | 25
The differentiation
The difference
Projecting—Thrownness
Happenstance
Event
Inception
Incipience
Receding
Parting
—
The essence of beyng can no longer only be beyng—the essential relation of beyng to the human must recognize the human as nothing but history, and that means as the essential unfolding of truth.
Everything to be left behind in the intimacy of parting.
Incipience is the “essence”; here, this says the incepting of inception. Because inception begins, and because incepting is ever more inceptive (which cannot mean the advancing of mere increase but rather only the particular singularizing into the singularity of an inception): because of this, incipience cannot be named in one word. Moreover, we know hardly anything of the incipience of experientially accessible inceptions. And every time, we come up against the danger of drawing out a “commonality” from inceptions and marking this itself down as inception.
The word “inception” remains polysemic and must maintain this polysemy, because in this way it holds the incipience of inception in the inceptive and never allows inception an explanation or a “conclusion.”
“The inception” can say: each and every incepting, and the fissured multiplicity of the inceptions whose singularity is thus in a certain way effaced.