34. Inception—Beyng—Beings | 37
Mere negativity but also the privative and its variant, dialectical negativity, breaks down in the evental essence of beyng (cf. the staying from out of the parting).
Certainly, one can always bring all saying, declaratively, into the framework of mere negation, of affirmative negation, and of deprivation. But if so, there is no guarantee that beyng has been thought or whether, instead, it is still been reckoned only in terms of beings.
But because all the telling appears in the first place to be “statement,” and because this appearance can be taken for its most proper being, no thinking of beyng can evade its misuse through “dialectic.”
Hegel attempted to save dialectic from atrophying through itself, by urging the broadening of its contents (aesthetics, philosophy of religion, of right, of history). But precisely here arose the flattening-out of the “dialectical”—which is in truth the actuality of spirit itself—into unstoppable formalism.
are, in the first and in the other incepting, Western. And since intimacy—abyssal inceptuality—belongs to the incepting, it is in the West that inception is confirmed. {GA 70: 51}
Confirmed in it and in its singularity, there belongs to inception an ultimate receding. None know of this singularity, just as none are capable of creatively thinking the uncommonness of inception, as if by this we mean a calculation.
In the essence of inception and of its receding there lies concealed, and sheltered as the most extreme intimacy, an ultimate receding. This receding determines an inceptive between-time, in which history does not necessarily continue with the same openness. But this highest possibility of inception—its receding—must, in that receding, also be thought in its finality.
If inception is beyng and beyng essences only inceptively, then beyng itself must (as event) yield “time” (time-play-space), in and with which it itself brings about its receding.