48 | I. The Incipience of Inception
each case historical in beginning as a decision about the essence of truth, then, at times, straying must come to the fore in beyng, and the unleashed straying [Irre] must determine the truth of beings (their “sense”). Sometimes, madness [Irrsinn] must unfurl into the world. And then it must be seen whether a humanity reckons only on beings or whether it is sufficiently inceptive to think from out of beyng.
as being, is original unfolding of the presencing {Anwesenheit} of the open, in the openness of which presence itself comes to presence.
Unconcealment is more inceptive but also more concealing and, therefore, more concealed than presencing {Anwesenheit}.
Presencing {Anwesenheit} is more inceptive (as emergence and retreat) than presence. Presence is more inceptive than constancy.
Constancy is more inceptive than objectivity.
Objectivity is more inceptive than mere certainty.
But this inceptiveness (as being) has long been advancing away from out of the first inception and can still not disavow it.
| The first inception: |
The being of beings is what is. (The telling) ἔστιν γάρ εῖναι (it presences, that is, as the presencing of what is present) |
| Metaphysics: |
Beings are, and their beingness consists in . . . (the statement) (The “is” is simply made use of) |
| Τhe crossing: |
Is beyng? (Original asking) the “is” becomes questionable and points toward dignity. |