102 | III. Event and Being-there
The essence of the human, then, is only essentially determined when “essence” is thought exclusively, and in an essentially fitting way, as being, and human being itself thought creatively out of the relation of beyng itself to the human. {GA 70: 125} This creative thinking of the human being leads into domains closed to all metaphysics, which in its obstinacy is anyway sealed off from these. These domains, though, are still veiled in the first inception, because it is in emerging as unconcealment that being first essences and first claims the human as the lingering in unconcealment, though directing him right away toward beings, which offer themselves to him as ζωή; the “life” within which it is λόγος that is objectively present and that supports the “human.”
But before it brings into play a determination of the human, the relation of beyng to the human already conceals in itself the appropriative eventuation of the clearing of the there that unfolds as being-there. Amid this singular and inceptive openness of all that is open (i.e., that is unconcealed in accord with being), the essence of the human vibrates, provided it is appropriated into the relation to being by being itself. The human is not the “human” in it additionally happens upon the relation to being. But on the other hand, this relation to being is also not only the relationship of the human to beings. The relation of being to the human is the event of the grounding of “being-in-the-world” that, for its part, already lets the relating to beings unfold.
Talk of the relation of beyng to the human is always problematic, in so far as it takes “the human” as something decided and determined in advance; whereas, what the discourse means is that it is beyng that first draws the human into relation [einbezieht in den Bezug], thus first initiating him into and detaining him [erzieht und hinzieht] in humanness.
The essence of the human, which is thought here only historically, that is, explicitly or implicitly in view of this relation, vibrates in its relation to beyng.
This vibrancy means the undecided plenitude of what is decidable through the human’s own standing-within being-there.
What thinking names inceptively as “νοῦς,” and as mens and “spirit” (reason) is already a kind of capacity, from out of which the human holds itself in vibration, without itself being able to appropriate this in an essentially inceptive way. Instead, the allotment of the human to being is immediately shifted into its relating to beings, a relating through which “being” is also then accepted, as κοινόν.
Every anthropology, even the “existentiell,” which retrieves “spirit,” opposing it to “life” and recognizing in the play of this opposition the fundamental trait of the human, remains closed off {GA 70: 126} from the inceptive thinking of the vibrancy.