104 | III. Event and Being-there
But how does he have this possibility? The fact that he has this, is already event—inceptuality.
This “the fact that” does not mean ascertaining an objective aptitude of a discoverable living creature.
This “the fact that”—is the beckoning of beyng into the inception.
“The human” must no longer in the first place be animal or even ζῶον λόγον ἒχον—8; instead, the human must, at once, sacrifice its belonging to inception in its suddenness. But whence this must? From the singularity of beyng.
Beyng never unfolds at the behest of the human; the human is, at most, at the behest of beyng. But this never means “because of” beyng; it means at the behest of so that the human, as itself, attains its essence.
Being is a happen-stance for the human; the appropriation into beyng does not depend on the human, and it also does not attest to any lack in beyng, as opposed to the human—as if being might need the human.
But when being unfolds in its truth and when this, as the inter-vening, eventuates beings, then the human has its distinctive determination toward the grounding of the truth of being in beings; and thence, in the aspect of nonessence, comes the possibility of presumption and of the domain of the overman.
(cf. Nietzsche’s Metaphysics9)
is the appropriative eventuation of the grounding of the essential unfolding of truth in the domain of the human, so long as truth unfolds as the unconcealing concealment in which the incipience of inception recedes into itself.
Admittedly, it seems at first as if only “accord” with beings would make it possible to leave beings to themselves and by themselves. And yet the adaequatio of representing is precisely the hidden mode of intrusiveness of the human, through which he delivers up beings to himself, but without thinking being inceptively. Indeed, representing appears to achieve a self-opening, and yet it is this
8. Unless we think ζῶον aletheically.
9. Nietzsche (GA 6.2), 231–300.