162 | VI. Being and Time and Inceptive Thinking
Thus, in a certain way, with absolute being, “being” is known, and this knowledge of certainty is ever the being and the truth of modern metaphysics, which therefore has its essential ground in that, as before, the question of being was altogether never posed. How then, ever, that of the truth of beyng??
After the manner of the preceding, it thus appears as if Being and Time is caught in the “transcendental” question; the writings immediately following strengthen this impression.
If this status of Being and Time is now conceded, a new appearance presses forward. It seems as if the transcending of the transcendental necessarily leads to Hegel and that the thinking of the history of beyng is only a variant of absolute metaphysics.
This would be utterly in error. Being and Time holds to the question of possibility only out of necessity. What is essential there, though, is that what is attempted is to think from out of beyng.
By contrast, Kant thinks from the object and about objectivity, thinking this from out of the beingness of beings. For Hegel and Schelling all this remains in place, even if turned into the unconditioned.
Hegel never thinks from out of beyng and of its essential unfolding in beings but, rather, from what is most in being and within it (absolute spirit, always only beingness; cf. the “Logic” as metaphysics).
Now, the playing-out of metaphysics (Hegel-Nietzsche) {GA 70: 193} is indeed closest to the crossing into the overcoming. This suggests that the crossing be taken as a variant of the playing-out of metaphysics. One can proceed thus “historically” and bring the state of affairs closer to historically accessible, supposedly familiar fundamental positions. But all this does not hit on the essential.
To call on Hegel for help, in order to make the thinking of the history of beyng “clear,” is to want to draw fire from water.
Hegel, furthermore, has never overcome the transcendental but rather first brought out its metaphysical ramifications, because the “conditions of possibility” become purely comprehensible only from out of the unconditioned.