is present—is interpreted by Aristotle as poiesis. Later interpreted as creatio, this leads in a straight line of admirable simplicity up to positing, as the. transcendental consciousness of objects. Thus it becomes evident that the fundamental characteristic of the letting-presence of metaphysics is production in its various forms. In contrast, we showed that the determining relation in Plato between presencing and what is present is not to be understood as poieses, although the "poetical" character of nous comes more and more to the foreground—above all in the Laws. In to kalo ta kala kala, only the parousia, the being together of the kalon with the kala is expressed without the meaning of the "poietic" with regard to what is present being attributed to this being together. And that shows that for Plato, the determination remains unthought. For nowhere does he work out what the true parousia is, nowhere does he say what the parousia accomplishes with relation to the onta. This gap is not closed by the fact that Plato tries to grasp the relation of presencing to what is present in the light metaphor, that is, not as poiesis, making etc., but as light. In this he is undoubtedly close to Heidegger. For the letting-presence thought by Heidegger is a bringing-into-the-open, although in the passage in question of the lecture it is and must be meant neutrally and openly against all kinds of making, constitution etc. In this the Greek element, light and radiance, has become explicit. But we must still ask what the metaphorical reference to light would like to say, but as yet cannnot say.

With the relation of letting-presence to aletheia, the whole question about the Being of beings is removed from the Kantian framework of the constitution of objects, although even the Kantian position is to be understood in retrospect in terms of aletheuein. The emphasis on the imagination in the book on Kant bears witness to this.

At this point the question was asked whether it was sufficient to understand the relation of presencing to what is present as unconcealing, if unconcealing is taken for itself, that is, if it is not determined with regard to content. If unconcealing already lies in all kinds of poiesis. of making, of effecting, how can one exclude these