modes and keep unconcealing purely for itself? What, then, does this unconcealing mean when it is not determined with regard to content? In reference to this, an important distinction was made between the unconcealing, which, for example, belongs to poiesis, and the unconcealing which Heidegger means. Whereas the first is related to eidos—this is what is set apart, unconcealed in poiesis—what Heidegger thinks with unconcealing is related to the totality of beings. Then the distinction between That-ness and What-ness, whose origin is obscure and unclarified, was mentioned (cf. Heidegger, Nietzsche II, pp. 399 ff.).
However, concerning the intention of the questions under consideration, it was said that the various modes of unconcealing which are determined with regard to content remain to be thought, although unconcealing in the passage in question is kept only as a fundamental trait. Thus the character of effecting is removed from the letting in letting-presence. With the step from presencing to letting-presence, and from there to unconcealing, nothing is decided about the character of presence in the different regions of beings. The task remains for thinking to determine the unconcealment of the different regions of things.
The same kind of movement which lies in the step from presencing to letting-presence is evident in the transition from letting-presence to unconcealing and from there to giving. In each case, thinking takes the step back. Thus the manner of procedure of this thinking could be viewed analogously to the method of a negative theology. That is also evident in the fact that, and the manner in which, ontic models given in language are used up and destroyed. For example, the usage of verbs is remarkable, verbs such as "reach," "send," "withhold," "appropriate," words which not only have a temporal form in general as verbs, but over and above that show a marked termporal meaning for something which is not temporal.
The fifth session began with Jean Beaufret's report whose function it was to serve as a foundation for the discussion of the repeatedly asserted similarity between Heidegger's and Hegel's thinking. The