of an essay which brings out the essence of metaphysics, and only thus brings metaphysics back within its own limits.

J: When you speak of overcoming metaphysics, this is what you have in mind.

I: This only; neither a destruction nor even a denial of metaphysics. To intend anything ebe would be childish presumption and a demeaning of history.

J: To us, at a distance, it had always seemed amazing that people never tired of imputing to you a negative attitude toward the history of previous thinking, while in fact you strive only for an original appropriation.

I: Whose success can and should be disputed.

J: The fact that this dispute has not yet got onto the right track is owing-among many other motives-in the main to the confusion that your ambiguous use of the word "Being" has created.

I: You are right: only, the insidious thing is that the confusion which has been occasioned is afterward ascribed to my own thinking attempt, an attempt which on its own way knows with full clarity the difference between "Being" as "the Beings of beings," and "Being" as "Being" in respect of its proper sense, that is, in respect of its truth (the clearing).

J: Why did you not surrender the word "Being" immediately and resolutely to the exclusive use of the language of metaphysics? Why d1d you not at once give its own name to what you were st:arching for, by way of the nature of Time, as the "sense of Being"?

I: How is one to give a name to what he is still searching for? To assign the naming word is, after all, what constitutes finding.

J: Then the confusion that has arisen must be endured.