PATHMARKS
[{GA 9: 124}] Aristotle sums up his analysis of the manifold meanings of the word ἀρχήa in the following way: πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι ὅθεν ἢ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται.2 Here the variations in what we are accustomed to call "ground" are identified: the ground of what-being, of that-being, and of being true. In addition, [22] however, there is the endeavor to grasp that wherein these "grounds" agree as such. Their κοινόν [what they have in common] is to τὸ πρῶτον ὅθεν, the First, starting from which ... Besides this threefold articulation of the foremost "beginnings" We also find a fourfold division of αἴτιον ("cause") into ὑποκείμενον, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἀρχή τῆς μεταβολῆς and οὗ ἕνεκα.3 This division has remained the predominant one in the subsequent history of "metaphysics" and "logic." Although πάντα τà αἴτια [all the causes] are recognized as άρχαί, the intrinsic connection between the divisions, and their principle in each case, remain obscure. And there must be some doubt as to whether the essence of ground can be found by way of characterizing what is "common" to the "kinds" of ground, even though there is an unmistakable orientation toward illuminating ground in general in an originary manner. Indeed, Aristotle was not content merely to list the "four causes" alongside one another, but was concerned with understanding their interconnection and the grounding of this fourfold division. This is shown both by his detailed analysis in Book II of the Physics and especially by the way in which the [{GA 9: 125}] question of the "four causes" is discussed in terms of the "history of the problem" in Metaphysics Book I, chapters 3-7. Aristotle concludes this discussion by noting: ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς διώρισται περὶ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ πόσα καὶ ποῖα, μαρτυρεῖν ἐοίκασιν ἡμῖν καὶ οὗτοι πάντες, οὐ δυνάμενοι θιγεῖν ἄλλης αἰτίας, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι ζητητέαι αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἢ οὕτως ἅπασαι ἢ τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον, δῆλον.4 [It appears, then, that all these thinkers, since they are unable to arrive at any other cause, testify that we have
a First edition, 1929: ἀρχή, (1) in general in its guiding meaning of the "First, starting from which," is already comprehended in terms of being qua presencing of something constant; (2) unfolded in its multiple articulation (the intrinsic connection between the threefold and fourfold division of αἴτια, the grounds for the absence of any grounding of this diverse articulation), but especially in terms of conducting the interpretation of beingness in accordance with what-being, that-being, and being true.
ἀρχή is not a guiding concept for being, but has itself sprung from the originary Greek determination of being.
The question concerning the essence of ground is therefore the question concerning the truth of beyng [Seyn] itself
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