PATHMARKS

has the fundamental character of the "for the sake of . . . ," and indeed in the originary sense that it first provides the intrinsic possibility for every factically self-determining "for your sake," "for his sake," "for the sake of that," etc. Yet that for the sake of which Dasein exists is it itself. To selthood there belongs world; world is essentially related to Dasein.

Before we attempt to inquire into the essence of this relation and thus to interpret being-in-the-world starting from the "for the sake of" as the primary character of world, we need to ward off several misinterpretations that may suggest themselves with regard to what has been said.

The statement: Dasein exists for the sake of itself, does not contain the positing of an egoistic or ontic end for some blind narcissism on the pan of the factical human being in each case. It cannot, therefore, be "refuted," for instance, by pointing out that many human beings [54] sacrifice themselves for others and that in general human beings do not merely exist alone on their own, but in community. The statement in question contains neither a solipsistic isolation of Dasein nor an egoistic intensification thereof. By contrast, it presumably gives the condition of possibility of the human being's being able to comport "himself" either "egoistically" or "altruistically." Only because Dasein as such is determined by selfhood can an I -self comport itself toward a you-self. Selfhood is the presupposition for the possibility of being an "I," the latter only ever being disclosed in the "you." Never, however, is selfhood relative to a "you," but rather - because it first makes all this possible - is neutral with respect to being an "I" and being a "you," and above all with respect to such things as "sexuality." All statements of essence in an ontological analytic of the Dasein in the human being take this being from the outset in such neutrality.

How then is Dasein's relation to world to be determined? Since world is not a being, and supposedly belongs to Dasein, this relation is evidently not to be thought as a relation between Dasein as one being and world as another. Yet if this is the case, does not world then get taken into Dasein (the subject) and declared as something purely "subjective"? Yet the task is to gain, through an illumination of transcendence, one possibility for determining what is meant by "subject" and "subjective." In the end, the concept of world must be conceived in such a way that world is indeed subjective, i.e., belongs to Dasein,⁶¹ but precisely on this account does not fall, as a being, into the inner sphere of a "subjective" subject. For the same reason, however, world is not merely objective either, if "objective" means: belonging among beings as objects.

As the respective wholeness of that for the sake of which Dasein exists in each case, world is brought before Dasein through Dasein itself. This

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