PATHMARKS


two assertions do not run parallel to each other, such that ἀλήθεια would correspond to the ὀρθά (what is correct) and νοῦς (apprehending) would correspond to the καλά (what is beautiful). Rather the correspondence works in crisscross fashion. Corresponding to the ὀρθά, what is correct and its correctness, there is correct apprehension, and corresponding to what is beautiful there is the unhidden; for the essence of the beautiful lies in being ἐκφανέστατον (cf. Phaedrus), that which, as most of all and most purely shining of and from itself, shows the visible form and thus is unbidden. Both sentences [138 {GA 9: 232}] speak of the primacy of the idea of the good as enabling both the correctness of knowing and the unhiddenness of the known. Here truth still is, at one and the same time, unhiddenness and correctness, although unhiddenness already stands under the yoke of the ἰδέα The same ambiguity in the determination of the essence of truth still prevails in Aristotle as well. In the closing chapter of Book IX of the Metaphysics (Metaphysics θ, 10, 1051 a34ff.) where Aristotelian thinking on the being of beings reaches its peak, unhiddenness is the all-controlling fundamental trait of beings. But Aristotle can also say οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ... ἀλλ᾽ ἐν διανοίᾳ (Metaphysics E, 4, 1027 b2 5ff.). "In fact, the false and the true are not in things (themselves) ... but in the intellect."

The assertion of a judgment made by the intellect is the place of truth and falsehood and of the difference between them. The assertion is called true insofar as it conforms to the state of affairs and thus is a ὁμοίωσις. This determination of the essence of truth no longer contains an appeal to ἀλήθεια in the sense of unhiddenness; on the contrary ἀλήθεια, now taken as the opposite of ψεῦδος (i.e., of the false in the sense of the incorrect), is thought of as correctness. From now on this characterization of the essence of truth as the correctness of both representation and assertion becomes normative for the whole of Western thinking. As evidence of that, let it suffice to cite the guiding theses that typify the characterizations of the essence of truth in the main epochs of metaphysics.

For medieval Scholasticism, Thomas Aquinas's thesis holds good: veritae proprie invenitur in intellectu humano vel divino (Quaestiones de Veritate, quaestio I, articulus 4, responsio): "Truth is properly encountered in the human or in the divine intellect." The intellect is where truth has its essential locus. In this text truth is no longer ἀλήθεια but ὁμοίωσις (adaequatio).

At the beginning of modem times Descartes sharpens the previous thesis by saying: veritatem proprie vel falsitatem non nisi in [139 {GA 9: 233}] solo intellectu esse posse (Regulae ad directionem ingenii, Regula VIII, Opuscula


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Martin Heidegger (GA 9) Pathmarks