ON THE ESSENCE AND CONCEPT OF Φύσις
IX. "But it is ridiculous to want to prove that φύσις is, because this (being as φύσις) appears of and by itself, insofar as [not 'that'] beings of this type show up everywhere among beings. But to demonstrate something that appears of and by itself (and above all) to prove something that refuses to appear - these are the actions of someone who cannot distinguish (from one another) something that of and by itself is familiar to all knowledge from something that of and by itself is not. But that such a thing can happen (i.e., such an inability to make the distinction) is not outside the realm of possibility: Someone born blind might try, through a sequence of reflections, to acquire some knowledge about colors. Of necessity in this case, such people arrive at an assertion about the nominal meanings of the words for colors, but by these means they never perceive the least thing about colors themselves." (193 a3-9)
"But it is ridiculous to try to prove that φύσις is." But why? Should we not take seriously some such procedure? 'Without a prior proof that something like φύσις "is," all explanations about φύσις remain pointless. So let us attempt such a proof. But in that case we have to suppose that φύσις is not, or at least that it is not yet proven in its being and as being. Therefore, in the course of our demonstration we may not permit ourselves to appeal to it. But if we take this restriction seriously, how could we ever find or point to something like φύσει ὄντα, growing things — animals, for example — the very things by means of which the being of φύσις is supposed to be proven? Such a procedure is impossible because it must already appeal to the being of φύσις, [333] and precisely for that reason this kind of proof is always superfluous. Already by its first step it attests of and by itself that its project is unnecessary. In fact, the whole undertaking is ridiculous. The being of φύσις and φύσις as being remain unprovable because φύσις does not need a proof, for wherever a φύσει-being stands in the open, φύσις has already shown itself and stands in view.
Regarding those who demand and attempt such a proof, one can at best draw their attention to the fact that they do not see the very thing that they already see, that they have no eye for what already stands in view for them. To be sure, this eye — which is not just for what one sees but for what one already has in view when one sees what one sees — this eye does not belong to everyone. This eye has the ability to differentiate what appears of and by itself and comes into the open according to its own essence, from what does not appear of and by itself. What appears antecedently — as φύσις does in the φύσει ὄντα, as history does in all historical occurrences, as an does in all artworks, as "life" does in all living things — what already stands in view is seen with the greatest difficulty, is grasped very seldomly, is almost always falsified into a mere addendum, and for these reasons simply overlooked. Of course, not everyone needs to explicitly hold in view what is already seen
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