ON THE ESSENCE AND CONCEPT OF Φύσις
XI. "Therefore different people say that either fire, or earth, or air, or water, or some of these ('elements'), or all of them, are φύσις proper and thus are the being of beings as a whole. For whatever each of these people [338] has taken antecedently (ὑπό) to be such as lies present in this way, whether it be one or many, that he declares to be beingness as such, whereas all the rest are modifications or states of what properly is or that into which a being is divided (and thus dissolved into relations); and each of these (that in each case constitute φύσις therefore remains the same, staying with itself (i.e., there does not accrue to them any change by which they might go out of themselves), whereas other beings come to be and pass away 'without limit.'" (193 221-28)
Here Aristotle summarizes the distinction between φύσις as the "elemental," taken as the only proper beings (the πρῶτον ἀρρύθμιστον καθ᾽ αὐτό), and non-beings (πάθη, ἕξεις, διαθέσεις, ῥυθμός) by once again introducing the opinions of other teachers and by making clear reference to Democritus. [From the viewpoint of the history of being, the basis of "materialism" as a metaphysical stance becomes apparent here.]
But more important is the last sentence of the section, where Aristotle thinks out and defines this distinction even more precisely by formulating it in terms of the contrast between ἀίδιον and γινόμενον ἀρειράκις. We usually think of this contrast as one between the "eternal" and the "temporal." On those terms, the primarily-present unformed is the "eternal," whereas all ῥυθμός, as change, is the "temporal." Nothing could be clearer than this distinction; yet one does not consider that this understanding of the distinction between eternity and temporality erroneously reads back into the Greek interpretation of "beings" notions that are merely "Hellenistic" and "Christian" and, in general, "modern." The "eternal" is taken as what endures without limit, with neither beginning nor end, whereas the "temporal" is limited duration. The viewpoint guiding this distinction is based on duration. Certainly the Greeks are acquainted also with this distinction regarding beings, but they always think the difference on the basis of their understanding of being. And this is quite distorted by the "Christian" distinction. [339] Already just from the Greek words for these concepts it is clear that the opposition of ἀίδιον and γινόμενον ἀρειράκις cannot refer to what limitlessly endures as opposed to what is limited, for in the text the so-called temporal means limitless coming-to-be and passing away. What is opposed to the ἀίδιον, the "eternal" as supposedly "limitless," is also something limitless: ἄπειρον (cf. πέρας). Now, how is all this supposed to hit upon the decisive contrast in terms of which "being" proper is determined? The so-called eternal is in Greek ἀίδιον — ἀείδιον; and ἀεί means not just "all the time" and "incessant." Rather, first of all it means "at
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