only a more precise explication of the specific character of a principle. The philosophical definition occasions a pre-"turning" to the object. such that I do indeed not "turn" to the content. The definition is "formally" indicative - the "way," the "approach." What is pre-given is a bond that is indeterminate as to content but determinate as to the way of actualization.
The phenomenological definition is this kind of specifically existentiell maturation; with it, in a decisive sense, the actualization of the understanding is such that, in of a basic experience, the way, just as it is indicated, is traversed "backward." In other words, the way is properly such that the claim is now made explicit for the first time and the task (category research), including the idea of the situation and of the preconception, is posed as the problematic. Then the basic existentiell experience can be taken up into concrete concern as what is factically decisive.
What is important at first is only this: the idea of determination. the logic of the grasp of the object, and the conceptuality of the object in the respective definitory determination must be drawn our of the mode in which the object is originally accessible. Also decisive for the definition are the situation of life in which the object comes to be experienced and, further, the basic intention in which the experience from the outset aims at the object (how the sense of the situation and of the anticipatory intentional grasp (the preconception) is "given its due").
The idea of definition in "formal" logic is thereby invalidated, and that is so already because this idea of definition, as well as "formal" logic itself, are not at all "formal" but always essentially spring from a "logical" problematic oriented toward a material region of objects (things, living beings, meanings) and toward the determinate way of cognitively intending and grasping the respective objects (by ordering and totalizing).
The erroneous tendency thus resides in the fact that with respect to the object and its possible possession a norm of determination is uncritically introduced, i.e., always accepted in the traditional way as if it were sell-evident. Yet this norm actually distorts the intentional grasp right from the beginning. The unquestioned use of this norm of determination and the resultant unreflective slipping into a tendency to grasp things in a certain way are possible because they lack the basic experience in which philosophizing "comes to language." It is then thought that we can compensate for this lack by collecting various opinions and pronouncements about what philosophy is supposed to be, among which we choose, in the end, according to use, taste, need, convenience, or fashion.
The absence of the full basic experience, i.e., of the one that would involve an immanent explication of the task, represses the radical