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§5 [27-28]


This history of the concept of truth is not accidental but is grounded in Dasein itself, insofar as Dasein moves in the common everyday sort of knowledge, in λόγος, and lapses into a fallenness into the world, into the λεγόμενον. While λόγος thus becomes a mere λεγόμενον, it is no longer understood that the "problem" lies in λόγος itself and in its mode of Being. But we could have already learned, precisely from Aristotle and Plato, that this spoken λόγος is the most extrinsic. Now is not the occasion to enter more thoroughly into this characteristic history of the fallenness of truth.

Let us retain the following: what is ἀληθές, is the πρᾶγμα; ἀληθεύειν is a determination of the Being of life; it is especially attributed to λόγος; Aristotle distinguishes primarily the five ways of ἀληθεύειν just mentioned; he distinguishes them with respect to λέγειν; they are μετὰ λόγου. The μετὰ does not mean that speech is an arbitrary annex to the modes of ἀληθεύειν; on the contrary, μετὰ—which is related to τὸ μέσον, the mean—signifies that in these modes, right at their heart, lies λέγειν. Knowing or considering is always a speaking, whether vocalized or not. All disclosive comportment, not only everyday finding one's way about, but also scientific knowledge, is carried out in speech. Λέγειν primarily takes over the function of ἀληθεύειν. This λέγειν is for the Greeks the basic determination of man: ζῷον λόγον ἔχον. And thus Aristotle achieves, precisely in connection with this determination of man, i.e., in the field of the λόγον ἔχον and with respect to it, the first articulation of the five modes of ἀληθεύειν.


§5. The first articulation of the five modes of ἀληθεύειν
(Nic. Eth. VI, 2).


a) The two basic modes of λόγον ἔχον: ἐπιστημονικόν
and λογιστικόν.


ὑποκείσθω δύο τὰ λόγον ἔχοντα (Nic. Eth. VI, 2, 1139a6): "Let this underlie our consideration: there are two basic modes of λόγον ἔχον." These are (1139a11f):

1.) the ἐπιστημονικόν: that which can go to develop knowledge; that λόγος which contributes to the development of knowledge, and

2.) the λογιστικόν: that which can go to develop βουλεύεσθαι, circumspective consideration, deliberation; that λόγος which contributes to the development of deliberation.

It is with regard to these that Aristotle distinguishes the modes of ἀληθεύειν mentioned above: