Plato's Sophist [47,48,49]

a) The object of φρόνησις: Dasein itself. The determination
of the τέλος of φρόνησις in delimitation against the τέλος of
τέχνη. Its relation to ἀληθεύειν: prior identity in φρόνησις;
difference (παρά) in τέχνη.

Aristotle begins by asking what natural Dasein understands by φρόνησις, i.e., which human being is called a φρόνιμος. δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν, πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως (1140a25ff.). "A φρόνιμος is evidently one who can deliberate well, i.e., appropriately, "who is βουλευτικός, and specifically who can deliberate appropriately over "that which is good (full and perfect) and which is, in addition, good αὑτῷ, for him, the deliberator himself..." The object of φρόνησις is hence determined as something which can also be otherwise, but from the very outset it has a relation to the deliberator himself. On the other hand, the deliberation of τέχνη relates simply to what contributes to the production of something else, namely, the ἔργον, e.g., a house. The deliberation of φρόνησις, however, relates to this ἔργον insofar as it contributes to the deliberator himself. The ἀληθεύειν of φρόνησις therefore contains a referential direction to the ἀληθεύων himself. Yet we do not designate as a φρόνιμος the one who deliberates in the correct way κατὰ μέρος, i.e., in relation to particular advantages, e.g., health or bodily strength, which promote Dasein in a particular regard. Instead, we call φρόνιμος the one who deliberates in the right way ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως, regarding "what is conducive to the right mode of Being of Dasein as such and as a whole. " The βουλεύεσθαι of the φρόνιμος concerns the Being of Dasein itself, the εὖ ζῆν, i.e., the right and proper way to be Dasein. Accordingly, φρόνησις entails a reference πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον (1140a29f.), "to that kind of τέλος which bestows seriousness," and specifically ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη (a30), "in relation to such beings which cannot be the theme of a fabrication or production. " The τέλος of φρόνησις is hence not παρά, over and against the Being of the deliberation itself, as is the case with the ἔργον of τέχνη. Rather, in the case of φρόνησις, the object of the deliberation is ζωή itself; the τέλος has the same ontological character as φρόνησις. τῆς μὲν γὰρ ποιήσεως ἕτερον τὸ τέλος, τῆς δὲ πράξεως οὐκ ἂν εἴη· ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος (1140b6ff.). "In the case of ποίησις, the τέλος is something other; but this does not hold for πρᾶξις: the εὐπραξία is itself the τέλος." In the case of φρόνησις, the πρακτόν is of the same ontological character as the ἀληθεύειν itself. And here, presumably, the τέλος is in fact disclosed and preserved; for it is the Being of the deliberator himself. The φρόνιμος is therefore not identical with the τεχνίτης for the ἀληθεύειν of the τεχνίτης is related to an other order of Being.

Martin Heidegger (GA 19) Plato's Sophist