βουλεύεται δ᾽ οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν (1140a31f.); "the βουλευτικός is not one who deliberates about what cannot be otherwise," just as in the case of the τεχνίτης. But the βουλευτικός deliberates οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι (a32f.); "nor does he deliberate about that which he cannot accomplish himself." In the deliberation of the φρόνιμος, what he has in view is himself and his own acting. Τέχνη, on the contrary, is cleverness, ingenuity, and resource regarding things I myself do not necessarily want to carry out or am able to carry out. The βουλευτικός is hence the one who deliberates with regard to the πρακτόν. The deliberation of φρόνησις is, furthermore, a certain drawing of conclusions: if such and such is supposed to occur, if I am to behave and be in such and such a way, then.... Here that from which and in constant consideration of which I deliberate, namely the οὗ ἕνεκα, is different in every case. In this way the deliberating of φρόνησις is a discussing, a λογίζεσθαι, but not an ἀπόδειξις, an ἐπιστήμη. Conversely, the necessary cannot, as such, be a possible object of deliberation. Thus the deliberation of φρόνησις, like that of τέχνη, is related to something which can be otherwise. And, as a deliberation, it again bears a certain resemblance to the one of τέχνη: if I am to act in such and such a way, then this or that must happen. Τέχνη would deliberate as follows: if such and such is to come to be, then this or that must happen. And yet φρόνησις is different from τέχνη; for in the case of τέχνη the πρακτόν is a τέλος which is παρὰ. Not so in the case of the τέλος of φρόνησις. This τέλος is a ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ (cf. 1140b5), "such a disposition of human Dasein, that it has at its disposal its own transparency."1 The τέλος of φρόνησις is not a πρὸς τι and not a ἕνεκά τινος; it is the ἄνθρωπος himself. αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος (b7), the proper Being of man is the τέλος. But this is ζωή πρακτική μετά λόγου. The τέλος of φρόνησις is a τέλος ἀπλῶς and a οὗ ἕνεκα, a "for the sake of which." Now insofar as Dasein is disclosed as the οὗ ἕνεκα, the "for the sake of which," there is a predelineation of what is for its sake and what has to be procured at any time for its sake. In this way, with Dasein as the οὗ ἕνεκα, there is grasped with one stroke the ἀρχή of the deliberation of φρόνησις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά (1140b16f.). These ἀρχαί are Dasein itself; Dasein finds itself disposed, and comports itself to itself, in this or that way. Dasein is the ἀρχή of the deliberation of φρόνησις. And what φρόνησις deliberates about is not what brings πρᾶξις to an end. A result is not constitutive for the Being of an action; only the εὗ, the how, is. The τέλος in φρόνησις is the ἄνθρωπος himself.
1. Editor's paraphrase, in accord with p. 37.