Δόξα possesses in a certain sense the character of simple knowledge; it is like a "thematic" opinion, a view, which has no impact on any particular action. Natural Dasein has certain views and opinions about the things of everyday life which come to pass and therefore change. And one might think that in fact δόξα, which is not a genuine mode of ἀληθεύειν, has its ἀρετή in φρόνησις. Aristotle thus takes up the possibility that the ground of φρόνησις is δόξα. He does not consider this just for the sake of completeness but, instead, because such opinions have arisen. Aristotle cuts this possibility short, however: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον (b28). "But φρόνησις is not a ἕξις of ἀληθεύειν, a ἕξις which is autonomous in itself and is only for the sake of a disclosing"; on the contrary, it is a ἕξις of ἀληθεύειν which is πρακτική. Because this pertains to its structure, from the very outset φρόνησις cannot be considered the τελείωσις of δόξα, which indeed aims only at the acquisition of views and opinions. Furthermore, it is to be noted that ἀληθεύειν, as it exists in δόξα, in μάθησις, and in ἐπιστήμη, has a peculiar character of fallenness. What I experience, notice, or have learned, I can forget; in this possibility, ἀληθεύειν is subject to λήθη (where the stem of the verb λανθάνειν lies hidden)—what is disclosed can sink back into concealment. The ability to become forgotten is a specific possibility of that ἀληθεύειν which has the character of θεωρεῖν. For the ἕξις μετὰ λόγου is a ἕξις of ἀληθεύειν into which Dasein places itself explicitly. In the case of φρόνησις things are different. This is manifest in the fact that I can experience, notice, and learn what has already been experienced, noted, and learned, whereas φρόνησις is in each case new. Hence there is no λήθη in relation to φρόνησις: σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι λήθη μὲν τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἔστι, φρονήσεως δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν (b28ff.). As regards φρόνησις there is no possibility of falling into forgetting. Certainly the explication which Aristotle gives here is very meager. But it is nevertheless clear from the context that we would not be going too far in our interpretation by saying that Aristotle has here come across the phenomenon of conscience. Φρόνησις is nothing other than conscience set into motion, making an action transparent. Conscience cannot be forgotten. But it is quite possible that what is disclosed by conscience can be distorted and allowed to be ineffective through ἡδονή and λύπη, through the passions. Conscience always announces itself. Hence because φρόνησις does not possess the possibility of λήθη, it is not a mode of ἀληθεύειν which one could call theoretical knowledge. Therefore φρόνησις is out of the question as the ἀρετή of ἐπιστήμη or of τέχνη. We will still look more closely at the connection ἐπιστήμη and τέχνη have to the two highest modes of ἀληθεύειν, φρόνησις and σοφία.
What is most striking now is that Aristotle designates σοφία as the ἀρετή of τέχνη (Nic. Eth. VI, 7, 1141a12). The highest mode of ἀληθεύειν, philosophical reflection, which according to Aristotle is the highest mode of human existence, is at the same time the ἀρετή of τέχνη.