"Those who have got used to a certain procedure can decide περὶ ἕκαστα, about the particulars, about every step, and have an understanding of how the ἔργα are to be carried out, which qualities are connected with which, and which concrete connections there are. The ἄπειροι, who indeed also have a knowledge of the work, must be satisfied that to them it is not entirely hidden (διαλανθάνειν: λανθάνειν—ἀ-ληθές!) whether the results are good or not."2 They have a judgment only about the bare result. To the ἔμπειρος even the εἶδος is no longer hidden. Although this transparency does lie in ἐμπειρία, the concrete connection as such still does not come into view. From this ἐμπειρία, τέχνη can develop.
c) Τέχνη. The modifications of the referential connection. The extraction of the εἶδος. If-then. Because-therefore. Τέχνη and ἐμπειρία. Καθόλου and καθ᾽ ἕκαστον.
γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις (Met. I, 1, 981a5ff.). "Τέχνη arises when there is... one ὑπόληψις, a determinate opinion, whose object is the καθόλου." In ἐμπειρία, certainty exists regarding the referential connection. If the ἐμπειρία is consolidated, then out of a repeated looking at the matter in question a ὑπόληψις μία καθόλου develops. Through the many single cases to which Dasein comports itself in ἐμπειρία in the mode of the "as soon as this, then that," and through repetition, constantly comporting itself to them in the mode of the "as soon as this, then that," what is one and the same and consequently the very "what" are extracted and understood (ἐννοεῖσθαι). Beyond the purely temporal connection, the "what" is disclosed. The εἶδος ἀφορίζεται (cf. a10), "the εἶδος is extracted," and the matter is now understood κατ᾽ εἶδος ἓν, in view of one outward look that persists and constantly recurs. What was given in ἐμπειρία in a wholly provisional understanding is thereby modified : the "as soon as-then" becomes the "if such and such, then so and so," the "if-then." This neutral "if" has from the first a quite remarkable meaning: it does not denote a mere "as soon as" but already a certain "because." If (and that means, in a certain sense, because) such and such appears, then I have to take these or those steps. In this way, therefore, a more genuine understanding modifies the referential connection. And the understanding becomes more genuine insofar as the outward look of the matter in question is extracted. The understanding is then no longer founded in a pre-presentification of the connection effective in practice, in a retention of the order of succession, but in an actual presentation of the outward look of the thing itself which is to be treated in some way or other.
2. This paraphrasing translation occurs in the notes taken by H. Jonas, F. Schalk, and H. Weiß.