§12 [79-81]

a) ἣ γὰρ ὡς ἕκαστον ἓν, "either in the sense that everything to be comprehended is one"

b) ἣ ὡς ἐκ τούτων τὸ ἓν, "or in the sense that the one is composed out of what is comprehended." In the latter instance, the ἕκαστα first constitute the ἓν, whereas in the case of a), every single thing is for itself the ὅλον.

An example of a) is the καθόλου: τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, καὶ τὸ ὅλως λεγόμενον ὡς ὅλον τι ὄν, οὕτως ἐστὶ καθόλου ὡς πολλὰ περιέχον τῷ κατηγορεῖσθαι καθ᾽ ἑκάστου καὶ ἓν ἅπαντα εἶναι ὡς ἕκαστον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἵππον θεόν, διότι ἅπαντα ζῷα (b29ff.). The καθόλου is a περιέχον in such a way that every ἕκαστον is itself this ὅλον. Thus, e.g., animate being is a ὅλον; man, horse, god are ἕκαστα. And animate being unifies these ἕκαστα into a united whole in such a fashion that every single one of them is, as such, animate being. We have not yet seen, however, what makes possible this peculiar character that, of many single things, each of them, as a single one, is the whole. This is possible only τῷ κατηγορεῖσθαι καθ᾽ ἑκάστου "by the fact that the ὅλον is predicated of each ἕκαστον." This determination is already indicated in the word καθόλου itself, insofar as the κατά refers to λέγειν as κατάφασις. The καθόλου belongs to Dasein insofar as Dasein is disclosive in the mode of λέγειν. The καθόλου is a ὅλον λεγόμενον, a ὅλον, a wholeness, which shows itself only in λέγειν. It is a ὅλον characterized by the fact that its Being is determined by accessibility in λόγος. How the καθόλου is a whole in relation to its unity can be seen only in κατηγορεῖσθαι. The καθόλου comprehends the singulars in such a way that every singular is as such ὅλον; ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος, θεός are in each case for themselves ζῷα. The Being of this wholeness has its ground in λέγεσθαι. The καθόλου is a ὅλον περιέχον λεγόμενον. Among the various kinds of ὅλον, the ὅλον as καθόλου has a preeminent position insofar as λέγειν functions in it.

The second type of the ὅλον περιέχον is given, b), in whatever is denoted as συνεχές: τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς καὶ πεπερασμένον, ὅταν ἕν τι ἐκ πλειόνων ᾖ, ἐνυπαρχόντων μάλιστα μὲν δυνάμει, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐνεργείᾳ (b32ff). A line, e.g., is a ὅλον, and specifically in such a way that it consists ἐκ πλειόνων, i.e., ἐκ στιγμῶν, out of single points. Here not every single point is the ὅλον, the line, but all points together first constitute the ἓν ; only together do they make the line. For the most part, the ἐνυπάρχοντα are only there δυνάμει. In the perception of a line the single points do not as a rule stand out explicitly; the pieces stand out only δυνάμει. But if not, then they are there ἐνεργείᾳ.

Prior to this meaning of ὅλον in the sense of συνεχὲς there is the primarily ontological meaning according to which the ὅλον is identical with the τέλειον, completeness. The full appurtenance of the determinations which constitute a being, the completeness, is the ὅλον in a primarily ontological sense.