§12 [82-83]

b) The mode of access as distingens between καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
and καθόλου. Αἴσθησις and λόγος. Πρὸς ἡμᾶς γνωριμώτερον
and ἀπλῶς γνωριμώτερον. The way of philosophy
(according to Top. VI, 4 and Met. VII, 3): from καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
to καθόλου.

The καθόλου is a determinate ὅλον; its distinctive feature derives from the fact that its Being is determined by accessibility in λόγος: it is a ὅλον λεγόμενον. The καθόλου can never be uncovered by an αἴσθησις, which is limited to mere visual appearance. In order to grasp the καθόλου I have to speak, address something as something. In this distinction between λόγος and αἴσθησις we also find the distinction between the καθόλου and the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον. The καθ᾽ ἕκαστον is a being as it initially presents itself, i.e., in αἴσθησις. The καθόλου is something which shows itself first and only in λέγειν. This distinction touches the fundamental question of the manner and the levels in which beings are accessible in their proper Being. Dasein can be disclosive according to two extreme possibilities. These are predelineated by the distinction we just mentioned: καθ᾽ ἕκαστον and καθόλου. It is striking that in the expression καθ᾽ ἕκαστον the κατά takes the accusative, and in the other case the genitive. With the accusative, κατά usually signifies stretching beyond something, whereas κατά with the genitive expresses the explicit grasp of that beyond which the comportment stretches itself. κατά with the genitive occurs, e.g., in the expression τοξεύειν κατά τινος, to shoot at someone with a bow, i.e., to shoot down at someone from a tree. The ὅλον in the καθόλου is hence, according to the genitive construction, characterized by the fact that it shows itself only insofar as it becomes an explicit theme; whereas in αἴσθησις the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον shows itself of itself, without becoming an explicit theme.

This distinctive feature of the καθόλου versus the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον is also captured in the distinction between the ἀπλῶς γνωριμώτερον and the πρὸς ἡμᾶς γνωριμώτερον:

1.) πρὸς ἡμᾶς γνωριμώτερον, i.e., ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον, in relation to us, those beings are better known and more familiar which are disclosed in our immediate comportment. And these are precisely the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, which show themselves in αἴσθησις. Beings in their proper Being, that which in beings is always already there and out of which everything further is determined-that is at first concealed to us.

2.) ἀπλῶς γνωριμώτερον, simply, without relation to us, with regard to beings on their own, what is more known is that which is simply there in beings, in such a way that it gives all other determinations their presence. And that is the καθόλου, that which is accessible primarily through λόγος or νοῦς, whereas the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον initially and for the most part falls under αἴσθησις.

Martin Heidegger (GA 19) Plato's Sophist