§13 [91-92]

"He is the one who καθόλου γνωρίζει (cf. a2f.) the being in question, "knows the being in its generality," but who thereby τὸ ἐν τούτῳ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἀγνοεῖ (cf. a22), "is unfamiliar with what in each case the being is for itself," the being which in this ὅλον is a ἕν among others. For τέχνη, thus, what is decisive is paying heed, watching, i.e., disclosure. Therefore Aristotle can say: <ἀρχιτέκτονες> τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν (981b1f.), "The architects know the causes of what is to be built." The following is thus manifest at the same time: the αἰτία, or the καθόλου, are initially not the theme of a mere onlooking. They indeed stand out as εἶδος, but not in such a way as to be the theme of a special investigation. The knowledge of the αἰτία is initially present only in connection with the fabricating itself; i.e., the αἰτία are present initially only as the because-therefore of such and such a procedure. The εἶδος is at first present only in τέχνη itself. But because in τέχνη the εἶδος is precisely already made prominent, therefore μᾶλλον εἰδέναι (a31f.), "to know more," is attributed to the τεχνῖται, and they are held to be σοφώτεροι than the mere ἔμπειροι. The μᾶλλον is hence attributed to them κατὰ τό λόγον ἔχειν (b6), with regard to the development of a discourse about just what is the object of the concernful dealing or the fabricating, i.e., with regard to disclosure. Within the fabricating, the λέγειν becomes more and more autonomous, and the naturally most immediate Dasein interprets it as σοφώτερον. Furthermore, one who λόγον ἔχον can make something understandable in the way it comes into its Being, how the whole fits together; he knows what it is composed of and what it contributes to, how thereby something becomes present as disposable just as it is. In this way, he can provide information about beings in regard to their origin, δύναται διδάσκειν (cf. b7f.). Therefore the naturally most immediate Dasein is of the opinion that τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι (cf. b8f.). Τέχνη, hence, because it possesses the λόγος and can provide information about beings in regard to their origin, is taken to be μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην than ἐμπειρία. In this way, within the γένεσις of σοφία, τέχνη draws near to ἐπιστήμη; it is even designated as ἐπιστήμη.

Hence what is called ἐπιστήμη is: 1.) τέχνη; 2.) the highest science, σοφία, in its determination as νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη (Nic. Eth. VI, 7, 1141a19f.).

Here the first sense, according to which ἐπιστήμη means the same as τέχνη), is the everyday one. In this everyday use, the concept of ἐπιστήμη occupies a peculiar mid-position. Specifically, τέχνη is designated as ἐπιστήμη insofar as, in distinction to ἐμπειρία, it already extracts the εἶδος. But this does not yet properly determine what constitutes the distinguishing character of ἐπιστήμη. Τέχνη is ἐπιστήμη, although it is properly a ἕξις ποιητικὴ and therefore aims at ποίησις. At the same time, however, it is a ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς (Nic. Eth. VI, 4, 1140a10). In τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη is most properly harnessed to an intention to fabricate.