Aristotle clarifies this πάντα as a ὅλον in the sense of the καθόλου; for πάντα he substitutes ὅλον. So he does not mean that the σοφός sees the whole as the sum of all the particulars; instead, the σοφός understands what every particular, along with the others, is ultimately. So it is clear that the πάντα, which the σοφός has at his disposal, is grounded in the ὅλον as the καθόλου. That is the genuine πᾶν, the whole, which the σοφός aims at. In such an understanding of "everything," what matters is the καθόλου, which is a ὅλον λεγόμενον; i.e., what matters is a preeminent λεγόμενον: λόγον ἔχειν. That is why Aristotle says: ἀνάγεται γὰρ τὸ διὰ τί εἰς τὸν λόγον ἔσχατον (Met. I, 3, 983a28). In σοφία what matters is that the why, the αἴτιον, be reduced to the most ultimate λόγος, to the most ultimate expression of beings in their Being. The disclosure of the καθόλου does not require one to run through each and every particular as such in explicit knowledge, and the καθόλου is not simply the sum of the particulars. Its peculiar feature is that it is a whole without a registration of each case as such. And nevertheless, or precisely for that reason, each case is understood in its genuine presence. The ground for this is the fact that at the very outset the σοφός leaps ahead to the genuine whole, whence he takes his orientation for the discussion of every concrete singular. Therefore he can genuinely partake in these discussions, despite having no specialized knowledge. In this way Aristotle reduces the common talk about the πάντα ἐπίστασθαι to the ὅλον as καθόλου.
2.) The reduction of the πάντα to the καθόλου immediately clarifies why the everyday interpretation claims that the σοφός aims at what is χαλεπόν, difficult, to know. χαλεπώτατα ταῦτα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου πορρωτάτω γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν (Met. I, 2, 982a24f.). What the σοφός knows is difficult, "because it is the most general of all." And "that is the farthest removed from what shows itself to immediate vision," where everyday considerations dwell. Αἴσθησις is, for the πολλοί, the most immediate dwelling place and mode of disclosure; αἴσθησις presents no difficulties, everyone moves in it, and one person can procure for another this everyday orientation or can assist him with it. The φύσις of man comprises a certain predilection for what is immediately given in αἴσθησις; this is the ἀγάπησις τῶν αἰσθήσεων (cf. Met. I, 1, 980a21). And especially if the orientation toward the necessity of making things falls away, if everyday Dasein is exempted from this orientation, if the onlooking becomes free, precisely then does Dasein lose itself all the more in the outward appearance of the world, but in such a way that Dasein remains always in αἴσθησις. Over and against this easy and obvious movement in immediate vision, an advancement beyond it to what genuinely is becomes difficult.