Plato's Sophist [130-131]

The question arises whether σοφία can be a κτῆσις ἀνθρώπου. This question, which arises here concerning κτῆσις, is the same as the one which arose in the Nicomachean Ethics concerning ἕξις: i.e., whether σοφία is a possible ἕξις of human Dasein.

Only after the clarification of this question will we be sufficiently prepared to decide whether it is φρόνησις, which as such has human Dasein for the goal of its uncovering, or σοφία that is the highest mode of uncovering. We will have to examine on what basis Aristotle decided about the mode of Being of φρόνησις in opposition to the mode of Being of σοφία as possibilities of human Dasein. This determination will make understandable at the same time the sense in which there can be a science such as ethics with regard to human life, insofar as ethics deals with the ἦθος, the Being of man, which can also be otherwise. The question is to what extent there can be a science of something like that, if indeed science proper is concerned with beings which always are.

Martin Heidegger (GA 19) Plato's Sophist