§22 [155-156]

Insofar as the ὀρθότης εὐβουλίας is ἀγαθοῦ τευκτική in each of its steps, it is ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, καὶ οὗ δεῖ καὶ ὣς καὶ ὅτε (b27f.). It is correctness with regard to what matters for the carrying out of the προαιρετόν ἀγαθόν, which is more precisely determined as: 1.) οὗ δεῖ, 2.) ὥς, and 3.) ὅτε, i.e., what it needs, how it is used, and when. All these moments must have the character of ἀγαθόν. ἔτι ἔστιν καὶ ἁπλῶς εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι καὶ πρός τὶ τέλος. ἣ μὲν δὴ ἁπλῶς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸ ἁπλῶς κατορθοῦσα, τὶς δὲ ἡ πρός τὶ τέλος (b28f.). Εὐβουλία itself can be carried out either as a discussion which is related straightforwardly to the ἀγαθόν or as a discussion that is πρὸς τι τέλος, i.e., related to a determinate τέλος, thus to a τέλος which again is πρὸς τι, related to another one.

Aristotle concludes by determining εὐβουλία in this way: εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψις ἐστιν (b31ff.). "Εὐβουλία is correctness in relation to what contributes to the end," i.e., contributes to the way of bringing an action to its end. The τέλος itself is for its part anticipated in φρόνησις. Φρόνησις is ὑπόληψις ἀληθὲς τοῦ τέλους. Ὑπόληψις is related to ὑπολαμβάνειν, to anticipate, grasp in advance. Ὑπό is often used in fundamental concepts: e.g., ὑποκείμενον (translated in Latin as sub-stantia), ὑπομένον, ὑπάρχον. These are expressions which indicate that something is already there at the outset: ὑποκείμενον, the substratum; ὑπομένον, that which always remains there; ὑπάρχον, that which is already there from the very outset in such a way that it dominates. ὑπάρχειν applies to the Being of the ἀρχή. Φρόνησις is ὑπόληψις ἀληθής τοῦ τέλους, "that which from the very outset grasps the τέλος" in such a way that this τέλος is ὑπό, in advance of everything, already there. And εὐβουλία, insofar as it is ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, is nothing else than the concrete mode of carrying out φρόνησις.

Φρόνησις itself, however, insofar as it is a constitutive moment of πρᾶξις, is explicitly related to beings that can also be otherwise. Every possible object of an action is a being that has the character of momentariness, specifically in the sense of the ἔσχατον. The πρακτόν is ultimately an ἔσχατον. We have to understand more precisely what is meant by saying that φρόνησις must be familiar with the ἔσχατον. It will turn out that they are matters for νοῦς.