Νοῦς is related to the πρῶτοι ὅροι, to the first demarcations, to the ἀρχαί pure and simple, to the ultimate elements of that which always is, as well as to the outermost in the sense of the momentary individual this-there. The latter is no longer a matter for discourse but instead is grasped simply in νοεῖν.
Aristotle then determines both these possibilities more precisely: καὶ ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀποδείξεις τῶν ἀκινήτων ὅρων καὶ πρώτων, ὁ δ᾽ ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου καὶ τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως (1143b1ff.). This is the first possibility: νοεῖν concerns the last outcomes of ἀπόδειξις, the theoretical demonstration of the ἀκίνητα, of beings which are not in motion. Here nothing else is meant than the ἀρχαί, which are objects of σοφία. The other possibility is the counter direction to this νοεῖν. The text has been transmitted: ἐν ταῖς πρακτικαῖς, with ἀποδείξεσιν understood. Victorius writes instead: ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς, with λόγοις understood.3 Within these πρακτικοὶ λόγοι there is also a νοεῖν. And here the νοεῖν is concerned with the ἔσχατον. Ἔσχατον is the counter-concept to what was called πρώτον in the case of ἀπόδειξις. To the ἀκινητόν, the ἀεί, corresponds the ἐνδεχόμενον. The straightforward grasping in νοεῖν relates here to an ἔσχατον which at every moment is always different.
And the grasping in νοεῖν relates, as Aristotle says, "to the other premise," ἑτέρα πρότασις (cf. b3). "Premise," πρότασις, is here understood in a broad sense as that which is posited in advance, that which stands before the consequent. Such προτάσεις do not only occur in the ἀποδείξεις of the ἐπιστῆμαι. For example, in public rhetoric the προτάσεις are the ἕνδοξα, the opinions which have prestige. Keep in mind that in this context, demonstration, in the sense of the ἐπιστῆμαι, as well as λογίζεσθαι, in the sense of circumspective discussion, have the structure of συλλογισμός. Βουλεύεσθαι is placed structurally in a συλλογισμός. Φρόνησις begins with a προαίρεσις: for the sake of this, for the sake of an ἀγαθόν (whichever one it may be), such and such is to be done. That is the first premise. And now the circumstances and the situation of the action are such and such. That is the second premise. The consequent is: hence I will act in such and such a way. The first premise concerns the grasping of the οὗ ἕνεκα, which is an ἐνδεχόμενον. The second premise concerns the finding of the ἔσχατον, the outermost point, at which the λογίζεσθαι comes to a halt. Now Aristotle says: τούτων οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ αἴσθησιν, αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ νοῦς(1143b5). "What is needed now is αἴσθησις, straightforward perception." In the deliberation over the situation in which I am to act, I finally touch upon the straightforward grasping of the determinate states of affairs on hand, the determinate circumstances, and the determinate time.
3. Susemihl, whose edition Heidegger cites, refers in his critical apparatus to the "codices Victori" for the reading ἐν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς. Victorius himself, however, in his edition of 1584 ( Petri Victorii commentarii in X libros Aristotelis De Moribus ad Nicomachum. Florentiae ex officina iunetarum 1584. ), has in the main text ἐν ταῖς κρακιικαῖς;