§23 [164-165]

On the other hand, the νοεῖν in σοφία is a looking upon that which is ἀεί, that which is always present in sameness. Time (the momentary and the eternal) here functions to discriminate between the νοεῖν in φρόνησις and the one in σοφία. In this way it becomes clear that φρόνησις, as well as σοφία, on the basis of the fact that they both harbor νοεῖν, are possibilities in which beings, according to the basic modes of their Being, are ultimately disclosed and become graspable ἐπ' ἀμφότερα (Nic. Eth. VI, 12, 1143a35f.), "from both sides" up to their ἀρχαί. On the basis of their being related to the ἀρχαί, φρόνησις and σοφία are the highest possibilities of the disclosure of beings themselves. Insofar as they are modes of Dasein, they constitute its mode of Being: σοφία is Dasein's positionality toward the beings of the world in the full sense. Φρόνησις is Dasein's positionality toward the beings which are themselves Dasein. With this, however, the question arises precisely as to the meaning of Being which provides the guiding line, on the basis of which Aristotle reaches the point that he can attribute to σοφία a priority over φρόνησις.6

We have now clarified the phenomenon of ἀληθεύειν,7 specifically as a possibility of human Dasein and as determining human Dasein in its Being. The goal of this reflection was to prepare us for the interpretation of a Platonic dialogue, to transpose us into the proper attitude to genuinely grasp the deliberation as it is carried out there and to sympathetically carry it out ourselves, step by step. Only if we acquire this attitude will we be guaranteed of seeing the things spoken of. A dialogue is carried out in διαλέγεσθαι. We will grasp more precisely how this διαλέγεσθαι, seen from the viewpoint of the maturity of Aristotle's philosophical reflections, proves to be a legitimate preliminary stage of philosophizing. In order to demonstrate this, we have to be conveyed ahead of time to a higher stage of philosophizing and understand the dialogue from that point of view, looking back down upon it. Already from this term, διαλέγεσθαι, you can see that what is at issue is λόγος. We will conclude our examination of ἀληθεύειν by bringing the highest and ultimate stage of ἀληθεύειν into connection with the question of the extent and accomplishment of λόγος within a theoretical consideration.

6. See the appendix.

7. Heidegger remarks here in his manuscript that in the meantime six sessions were canceled. (See the editor's epilogue, p. 456.) That is why he begins now with a reflection on the meaning of the Aristotle part of the lecture course.