Φρόνησις is nothing if it is not carried out in πρᾶξις, and πρᾶξις as such is determined by ἀρετή, by the πρακτόν as ἀγαθόν. Merely possessing the τέλος of an action, merely having φρόνησις at our disposal, does not yet make us πρακτικώτεροι; we are not thereby led to act better morally if we are not already good. εἴπερ ἡ μὲν φρόνησις ἐστιν ἡ περὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ἃ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς πράττειν, οὐδὲν δὲ πρακτικώτεροι τῷ εἰδέναι αὐτά ἐσμεν, εἴπερ ἕξεις αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσιν (1143b21ff.). The mere self-standing ἀληθεύειν of φρόνησις has no effect on action unless this φρόνησις is carried out by someone who is himself ἀγαθός. Just as οὐθὲν πρακτικώτεροι τῷ ἔχειν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἐσμεν (cf. b26ff.). Just as little as we become more able to act and to intervene just by mastering ἰατρική, just by possessing the art of healing purely theoretically, i.e., if we have not actually learned how to use it by becoming doctors ourselves. The mere having of the orientation and guidance does not place us on the level of Being which genuinely corresponds to the meaning of ἀληθεύειν. Insofar as φρόνησις, with regard to the possibility of its correct execution, depends on being carried out by an ἀγαθός, it is not itself autonomous. Thereby the priority of φρόνησις is shaken, although φρόνησις does indeed relate to human Dasein.
On the other hand, the question still remains: how can σοφία be the highest possibility, since it does not have to do with human Dasein? ἡ μὲν γὰρ σοφία οὐδὲν θεωρήσει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται εὐδαίμων ἄνθρωπος (οὐδεμιᾶς γάρ ἐστιν γενέσεως) (b18ff.). Σοφία is indeed autonomous but what is thematic in it is the act, hence that which has nothing at all to do with γένεσις, whereas the Being of human Dasein intrinsically involves γένεσις, πρᾶξις, κίνησις. The pure understanding of the philosopher does not consider whence man could properly come into being. What philosophy considers, according to its very meaning, settles nothing for human existence. This assertion already shows that Aristotle is as far removed as possible from a religious world-view or the like. Thus the following difficulty results:
1.) φρόνησις specifically concerns human Dasein; but because it is dependent on the Being of man as ἀγαθός, it is not autonomous.
2.) On the other hand, σοφία is indeed autonomous, insofar as it is purely concerned with the ἀρχαί ; but because it is concerned precisely with the ἀεί, it does not settle anything as regards human Dasein.
At bottom the difficulty consists in this, that both, φρόνησις and σοφία, are not ἕξεις.
This now requires a solution. Aristotle himself solves the difficulty at 1141a1ff.