It is rather the Being of the same beings of which the categories are also determinations of their Being. It is just that the categories pertain to beings themselves as beings, whereas the ἀληθές is a character of the Being of beings only insofar as beings are there and present for a grasping. Hence there is no question at all here of logical Being, of the validity or invalidity of judgment. The ὂν ὡς ἀληθές is rather the same beings which also are the theme of ontology: the beings of the world. Closer inspection will discover that Aristotle ultimately assigns even this character, this Being, to ontological research.10 The ὂν ὡς ἀληθές proves to be a character of Being insofar as Being is encountered. Thereby we will acquire an insight into the dimension of the meaning of truth for Aristotle. It will be shown that truth, unconcealedness, is not at home in λόγος. But if not in λόγος, the positive question arises: where then? From this point we acquire again an orientation toward the central question of the Sophist, the question of the Being of ψεῦδος, whether there is such a thing as μὴ ὄν, whether non-being is. Our consideration of the problem of the ἀληθές will be conducted only far enough for us to learn from Aristotle the general orientation of the Sophist.11
10. Met. IX, 10.
11. See the appendix.