§56 [315-316]

in favor of taking λόγος here in this broad sense is the fact that the Phaedrus does not deal merely with the spoken λόγος but also with the written, the γράμματα: not only with what is said in the stricter sense, but also with outward expression in the sense of writing, the written work, the treatise. Likewise, in the first part, Socrates' second speech deals with the soul, but his aim is not to present a psychology, not even a metaphysical one. On the contrary, his concern is to expose the basic determination of the existence of man, precisely the concern of the second part of the dialogue, and human Dasein is seen specifically in its basic comportment to beings pure and simple. And the love Socrates speaks of, both the natural and the purified, is nothing else than the urge toward Being itself. Thus the three main topics of the dialogue, love, speech, and the soul, all center around one phenomenon, namely human Dasein, or around Socrates himself, to refer to a single individual.

b) General characterization of the first part of the Phaedrus. The preeminent significance of λόγος for the central theme of the Phaedrus. Socrates' love for λόγος (or for speaking) as a passion for self-knowledge.

The strength of the phenomenon of λόγος in this context of human existence is already evident in the first part (it is not at all necessary here to appeal to the second part) where Socrates characterizes himself, somewhat ironically, in opposition to Phaedrus, who is enraptured with the rhetoric of the time and always carries in his pocket the speeches of Lysias. Just as Phaedrus is coming from Lysias' school, he encounters Socrates, who stops him and says, ἀπαντήσας δὲ τῷ νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν² (228b6f.). "You have met someone who is love-sick over hearing speeches." Thereby it is already clear (and we will see it again in another passage) how much, i.e., how completely, Socrates was concerned with λόγος, correct self-expression, insofar as he understood self-expression to involve nothing other than self-disclosure, i.e., the disclosure of the self to itself. Therefore he speaks of being love-sick for speech, for hearing speeches, and, as one with that, he speaks of his passion for self-knowledge. A telling passage, which seems to me to be characteristic of Socrates in general occurs at 229e5ff., where Socrates admits: οὐ δύναμαί πω κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἐμαυτόν: γελοῖον δή μοι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἔτι ἀγνοοῦντα τὰ ἀλλότρια σκοπεῖν. ὅθεν