Plato's Sophist [479-480]
this definition? Οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἡμῖν (c1), "they will not agree" with our determination of οὐσία = δύναμις. And the ξένος repeats this definition once again-the fourth formulation, which is actually no reason to interpret this definition as an artifice: ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν δύναμις; (cf. 248c5). Consequently, we now have the following formulations:
1.) δυνατόν τῳ παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι (247a8).
2.) κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἴτ᾽ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν εἴτ᾽ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν (cf. 247d8f.).
3.) δύναμις ἐξ ἦς πάθημα ἢ ποίημα γιγνόμενον (cf. 248b5f.).
4.) ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν δύναμις (cf. 248c5).
Why will the εἰδῶν φίλοι not agree with this interpretation of Being? They will say in opposition the following: ὅτι γενέσει μὲν μέτεστι τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ ποιεῖν δυνάμεως, πρός δὲ οὐσίαν τούτων οὐδετέρου τὴν δύναμιν ἀρμόττειν (248c7ff.). Γένεσις indeed involves, μέτεστι, δύναμις"; where there is motion and change there can perhaps be something like potentiality, such that we can ultimately interpret in this way the Being we ourselves address as μὴ ὄν. "But there is no αρμόττειν πρὸς οὐσίαν, between οὐσία and δύναμις." Thus again we have προσ-αρμόττειν—just as earlier we had προσγίγνεσθαιτψ ὄντι ἔτερον τῶν ὄντων, something comes to be attached to something else—and the other corresponding expressions.2 To be related to each other, to be with each other—this is the one phenomenal state of affairs constantly dealt with here. Being means nothing else than to be able to be with each other, or formulated differently, in relation to Being as δύναμις, to be capable of presence with something.
But the εἰδῶν φίλοι resist this interpretation of Being. For this interpretation ultimately includes—as will be shown—the co-presence of movement in οὐσία.
b) The co-presence of movement in οὐσία.
a) Being-known as the πάθος of οὐσία.
If the εἰδῶν φίλοι resist the interpretation of Being as δύναμις κοινωνίας and hence do not agree with it, then the question arises: Οὐκοῦν λέγουσί τι; (c10), "do they have good grounds for doing so?" To this extent, says the ξένος, that we must ask them for more precise information concerning εἰ προσομολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γιγνώσκειν, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν γιγνώσκεσθαι (248d1 f.). Here there occurs again the state we left open earlier: φρόνησις.3 "Do they agree that the soul can be familiar, or is familiar, with something, and that what it is familiar with in knowledge is οὐσία?" Will they concur with this? Yes. But what about this γιγνώσκειν? How must it be conceived?
2. Cf. p. 291ff.
3. Cf. p. 327.