Plato's Sophist

Table of Contents


§ 1. The necessity of a double preparation for interpreting the Platonic dialogues. 5
a) Philosophical-phenomenological preparation. Method and aim of phenomenology 5
b) Historiographical-hermeneutical preparation. The basic principle of hermeneutics: from the clear into the obscure. From Aristotle to Plato. 7
c) First indication of the theme of the Sophist. The sophist. The philosopher. The Being of beings. 8
§ 2. Orientation toward Plato's Sophist, with Aristotle as point of departure. 9
a) The theme: the Being of beings.9
b) The way of access: knowledge and truth. Ἀλήθεια.10
§ 3. First characteristic of ἀλήθεια. 10
a) The meaning of the word ἀλήθεια. Ἀλήθεια and Dasein10
b) Ἀλήθεια and language (λόγος). Ἀλήθεια as a mode of Being of man (ζῷον λόγον ἔχον) or as a mode of life (ψυχή).12


The Securing of ἀλήθεια as the Ground of Plato's Research into Being.
Interpretations of Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics Book VI and Book
X, Chapters 6-8; Metaphysics Book I, Chapters 1-2

Chapter One

Preparatory Survey of the Modes of ἀληθεύειν (ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη,
φρόνησις. σοφία, νοῦς) (Nic. Eth. VI. 2-6)

4. The meaning of ἀληθεύειν in Aristotle for Plato's research into Being. 15
a) The five modes of ἀληθεύειν (Nic. Eth. VI, 3). Ἀληθεύειν as ground of research into Being. Ἀλήθεια as the determination of the Being of Dasein (ἀληθεύει ή ψυχή). 15
b) The history of the concept of truth.17
§ 5. The first articulation of the five modes of ἀληθεύειν (Nic. Eth. VI, 2) 19
a) The two basic modes of λόγον ἔχον: ἐπιστημονικόν and λογιστικόν 19
b) Task and first outline of the investigation.21
§ 6. The determination of the essence of ἐπιστήμη (Nic. Eth. VI, 3) 21
a) The object of ἐπιστήμη: beings that always are (ἀίδιον). Ἐπιστήμη as ἕξις of ἀληθεύειν. The interpretation of Being on the basis of time (ἀίδιον, ἀεί, αἰών).22
b) The position of the ἀρχή in ἐπιστήμη (Nic. Eth. VI, 3; Post. An. I, 1). The teachability of ἐπιστήμη. Ἀπόδειξις and ἐπαγωγή. The presupposition of the ἀρχή. 24
c) Πρᾶξις and ποίησις as the first ways of carrying out ἀληθεύειν. Ἐπιστήμη as the autonomous "πρᾶξις" of ἀληθεύειν. 26
§ 7. The analysis of τέχνη (Nic. Eth. VI, 4) 28
a) The object of τέχνη: what is coming into being (ἐσόμενον)28
b) The position of the ἀρχή in τέχνη (Nic. Eth. VI, 4. Met. VII, 7). The double relation of τέχνη to its ἀρχή. Εἶδος und ἔργον. The παρά-character of the ἔργον. 28
c) The εἶδος as ἀρχή of the κίνησις of τέχνη as a whole (Met. VII, 7). Νόησις and ποίησις. Τέχνη as ground of the interpretation of Being through the εἶδος. 31
8. The analysis of φρόνησις (Nic. Eth. VI, 5) 33
a) The object of φρόνησις: Dasein itself. The determination of the τέλος of φρόνησις in delimitation against the τέλος of τέχνη. Its relation to ἀληθεύειν: prior identity in φρόνησις; difference (παρά) in τέχνη. 34
b) Φρόνησις as ά-ληθεύειν. Ἡδονή and λύπη. Σωφροσύνη. Φρόνησις as a struggle against Dasein's inherent tendency to cover itself over. Φρόνησις as non-autonomous ἀληθεύειν in the service of πρᾶξις. 36
c) The delimitation of φρόνησις versus τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη. Φρόνησις as ἀρετή. Φρόνησις as "unforgettable" conscience. Σοφία as ἀρετή τέχνης. 37
§ 9. The analysis of σοφία (Nic. Eth. VI, 6-7) 40
a) The dia-noetic relation of ἐπιστήμη, φρόνησις and σοφία to the ἀρχαί (Nic. Eth. VI, 6) 40
b) Νοῦς as ἀληθεύειν of the ἀρχαί. (Nic. Eth. VI, 7). Σοφία as νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη 41
c) The further outline of the investigation. Φρόνησις and σοφία as the highest modes of ἀληθεύειν. The priority of σοφία. The origin of this priority in the natural understanding of Greek Dasein. The phenomenology of Dasein as the method of the investigation. Θεωρία: clarification of the term and history of the concept. 42

Chapter Two

The Genesis of σοφία within Natural Greek Dasein (αἴσθησις,
ἐμπειρία, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, σοφία) (Met. I, 1-2)

§ 10. Introductory characterization of the investigation. Its guiding line: the self-expression of Dasein itself. Its course: the five levels of εἰδέναι. Its goal: σοφία as μάλιστα ἀληθεύειν. 45
§ 11. The first three levels of εἰδέναι: αἴσθησις, ἐμπειρία, τέχνη (Met. Ι, 1) 48
a) ΑἼσθησις. The priority of ὁρᾶν. Ἀκούειν as a condition of learning. Μνήμη and φρόνησις. 48
b) Ἐμπειρία. The referential connection: as soon as-then. Its temporal character. 49
c) Τέχνη. The modifications of the referential connection. The extraction of the εἶδος. If-then. Because-therefore. Τέχνη and ἐμπειρία. Καθόλου and καθ᾽ ἕκαστον. 51
§ 12. Excursus: καθόλου und καθ᾽ ἕκαστον. The way of philosophy (especially: Met. V, 26; Top. VI, 4; Phys. I, 1) 54
a) The manifold meanings of ὅλον. Καθόλου as ὅλον λεγόμενον (Met. V, 26) 54
b) The mode of access as distingens between καθ᾽ ἕκαστον and καθόλου. Αἴσθησις and λόγος. Πρὸς ἡμᾶς γνωριμώτερον and ἀπλῶς γνωριμώτερον. The way of philosophy (according to Top. VI, 4 and Met VII, 3): from καθ᾽ ἕκαστον to καθόλου. 57
c) The way of philosophy (Phys. Ι, 1). From the καθόλου τo the καθ᾽ ἕκαστον. Resolution of the supposed contradiction between Topics VI, 4 und Physics I, 1. 59
§ 13. Continuation: τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη (Met. 1,1). The tendency residing in τέχνη toward an "autonomous" ἐπιστήμη. The further development of ἐπιστήμη. 62
§ 14. Σοφία (Met. I, 2). The four essential moments of σοφία (πάντα, χαλεπώτατα, ἀκριβέστατα, αὐτῆς ἕνεκεν). Clarifying reduction of the first three essential moments to the μάλιστα καθόλου. 65
§ 15. Excursus: General orientation regarding the essence of mathematics according to Aristotle. 69
a) Fundamental issues in mathematics in general (Phys. II, 2). Χωρίζειν as the basic act of mathematics. Critique of the χωρισμός in Plato's theory of Ideas. 69
b) The distinction between geometry and arithmetic. The increasing "abstraction" from the φύσει ὄν : στιγμή = οὐσία θετός; μονάς = οὐσία ἄθετος. 71
α) Τόπος and θέσις (according to Phys. V, 1-5). The absolute determinateness (φύσει) of τόπος; the relative determinateness (πρὸς ἡμᾶς) of θέσις. The essence of τόπος: limit (πέρας) and possibility (δύναμις) of the proper Being of a being. 72
β) The genesis of geometry and arithmetic from τόπος. The acquisition of geometrical objects by extraction of the πέρατα (τόπος) of the φύσει ὄντα. The determination of their site (θέσις). Analysis situs. Μονάς: οὐσία ἄθετος. 75
γ) The structure of the connection of the manifold in geometry and arithmetic; συνεχές and ἐφεξῆς. 77
αα) The phenomena of co-presence as regards φύσει ὄντα (Phys. V, 3) 77
ββ) The structures of connection in the geometrical and the arithmetical: συνεχές and ἐφεξῆς. 79
γγ) Consequences for the connecting of the manifold in geometry and arithmetic (Cat. 6). 81
§ 16. Continuation: σοφία (Met I, 2; 1. Teil). The fourth essential moment of σοφία: the autonomy of its ἀληθεύειν (ἑαυτῆς ἕνεκεν. μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν). 83
a) What is thematic in σοφία. The ἀγαθόν as τέλος and ultimate οὗ ἕνεκα; as αἴτιον and ἀρχή: as object of pure θεωρεῖν. 84
b) The origin of σοφία in Dasein itself. Θαυμάζειν and ἀπορεῖν as origin of philosophy. The tendency in Dasein itself toward pure θεωρεῖν. 86
§ 17. Summary: The modes of ἀληθεύειν as modifications of self-orienting Dasein. 89

Chapter Three

The Question of the Priority of φρόνησις or σοφία as the Highest
Mode of ἀληθεύειν (Met. I, 2, part 2; Nic. Eth. VI, 7-1 0, X, 6-7)

§ 18. The divinity of σοφία and the questionableness of σοφία as a possibility of man (Met. I, 2; part 2). Σοφία as constant dwelling with the ἀεί. Human Dasein as "slave" (δούλη) of ἀναγκαῖα and ἄλλως ἔχοντα. The priority of σοφία with respect to ἀληθεύειν. 91
§ 19. Φρόνησις as the proper possibility of man, and the rejection of φρόνησις as "σοφία". (Nic. Eth. VI, 7; part 2). The gravity of φρόνησις. The ἀκρότατον ἀγαθόν ἀνθρώπινον as object of φρόνησις. The ἄριστον ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ as object of σοφία. Predelineation of ontological superiority as criterion of the priority of σοφία. 93
§ 20. More radical conception of φρόνησις (Nic. Eth. VI, 8-9) 95
a) Φρόνησις as πρακτικὴ ἕξις (Nic. Eth. VI, 8)95
b) The mode of origin of φρόνησις and ἐπιστήμη (Nic. Eth. VI, 9). Φρόνησις: ἐξ ἐμπειρίας (life experience). Mathematics: δι' ἀφαιρέσεως. 96
§ 21. Exposition of the further tasks: the relation of φρόνησις and of σοφία to the ἀρχαί. Σοφία: νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη. The task of the clarification of the βουλεύεσθαι of the mode of carrying out φρόνησις. 98
§ 22. Εὐβουλία as the mode of carrying out φρόνησις (Nic. Eth. VI, 10) 99
a) The structure of the βουλεύεσθαι 100
α) Structural analysis of action. The constitutive moments of action. Ἀρχή and τέλος of action. Εὐπραξία and εὐβουλία. 100
β) Εὐβουλία as genuine φρόνησις. The correctness (ὀρθότης) of the εὐβουλία. The resolution (βουλή). The βουλεύεσθαι as συλλογίζεσθαι. The ὀρθὸς λόγος. 102
b) Delimitation of εὐβουλία against other modes of ἀληθεύειν. Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), sureness of aim (εὐστοχία), presence of mind (ἀγχίνοια), opinion (δόξα) 104
c) The ὀρθότης of εὐβουλία. Being persistently directed to the ἀγαθόν. 106
§ 23. Φρόνησις and νοῦς (Nic. Eth. VI, 12) 108
a) Νοῦς in σοφία and in φρόνησις. The double direction of νοῦς. Σοφία: νοῦς → πρῶτα; φρόνησις: νοῦς → ἔσχατα. The practical syllogism. Practical νοῦς as αἴσθησις. 108
b) Practical νοῦς and αἴσθησις (Nic. Eth. VI, 9; 111,5). Αἴσθησις as the grasping of the ἔσχατα. Comparison with ἀνάλυσις in geometry. Modes of αἴσθησις. Geometrical and practical αἴσθησις. 110
c) φρόνησις and σοφία as opposite highest modes of ἀληθεύειν (= νοῦς). Ἀεί and the moment. Prospect: νοῦς and διαλέγεσθαι. Aristotle and Plato. 112
§ 24. The decision on the question of the priority of φρόνησις or σοφία in favor of σοφία (Nic. Eth. VI, 13). 114
a) The difficulty of the decision: merits and deficiencies of φρόνησις and σοφία. The question of the relation to human Dasein. The autonomy and non-autonomy of the ἀληθεύειν. 114
b) Criteria for the decision. The rank of the ἀληθεύειν as such. The autonomy of the "accomplishment" (ποιεῖν); σοφία as ὐγίεια of the ψυχή. Ontological priority according to the Greek concept of Being. 116
§ 25. The priority of σοφία with regard to εὐδαιμονία (Nic. Eth. X. 6 7). 118
a) The idea of εὐδαιμονία (Nic. Eth. X, 6). The ontological meaning of εὐδαιμονία as the fulfilled Being of the ψυχή. 118
b) The structural moments of εὐδαιμονία and their fulfillment through the θεωρεῖν of σοφία (νοῦς) (Nic. Eth. X, 7) 119
§ 26. Extent and limit of λόγος 123
a) λόγος und νοῦς. Νοεῖν and διανοεῖν. The grasping of the πρῶτα and ἔσχατα by νοεῖν. 123
b) λόγος and ἀλήθεια. 124
α) Λόγος σημαντικός (speech) and λόγος ἀποφαντικός ("judgment") (De Int., chapter 4; II, 8). 124
β) Rejection of λόγος as the proper place of truth. Νοεῖν als ἀληθεύειν without λόγος. The λόγος ἀποφαντικός as the place of ψεῦδος. The synthetic structure of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός as the condition of ψεῦδος. 125
γ) Critique of the traditional theory of judgment. Σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις as basic structures of the λόγος ἀποφαντικός in general. 126
δ) The ἀληθές as a character of Being as encountered (Met. VI, 2 and 4) 128


Delineation of the Thematic Field, with ἀληθεύειν
as the Point of Departure

§ 27. What has been accomplished up to now and the future task. What has been accomplished: the acquisition of the point of departure (= ἀληθεύειν). The task: the delineation of the theme, with ἀληθεύειν in Plato (= διαλέγεσθαι) as the point of departure. First indication of the theme: a revolution in the concept of Being; the Being of non-beings ( = ψεῦδος). 131
§ 28. First characterization of dialectic in Plato. 135
a) Διαλέγεσθαι as ἀληθεύειν. Repetition and continuation of what has been established about λόγος: rejection of λόγος as the proper place of truth. Λόγος, as the most immediate mode of ἀληθεύειν and as concealing prattle. The basic meaning of "dialectic": breaking through the prattle, tendency toward seeing (νοεῖν). 135
b) Critique of the traditional conception of dialectic. Dialectic: not a technique of thinking but a preliminary stage of νοεῖν. Aristotle's position with regard to dialectic. 137
c) The meanings of the expression "λόγος" in Plato. 139
§ 29. Addendum: The innovation in Plato's Sophist with regard to
the ground of the Greeks' research into Being.
a) The double guiding line of the research into Being in Plato's Sophist: concrete Dasein (the philosopher, the sophist); λέγειν. 141
b) Λόγος as guiding line of Aristotle's research into Being ("ontology"). 142
§ 30. Aristotle on philosophy, dialectic, sophistry (Met. IV, 1-2). 144
a) The idea of first philosophy. First philosophy as the science of ὂν ᾗ ὄν. Delimitation of first philosophy versus the special sciences. Being as φύσις τις. The ancients' research into the στοιχεῖα. Further structures of Being. First and second philosophy. 144
b) Delimitation of dialectic and sophistry versus first philosophy. The common object of dialectic, sophistry, and philosophy: the "whole." How dialectic and sophistry are distinct from philosophy: philosophy = γνωριστική dialectic = πειραστική: sophistry = φαινομένη σοφία (εὗ λέγειν). 147
§ 31. First characterization of sophistry. Continuation. 149
a) The idea of παιδεία in sophistry and in Aristotle. Εὗ λέγειν. Concern with substantive content and unconcern with substantive content. Predelineation of ἀληθεύειν as the ground of sophistry. 149
b) Critique of the traditional interpretation of sophistry. 150
c) Sophistry and rhetoric. Plato's position on rhetoric as distinct from Aristotle's. Their common judgment on sophistry (φαινομένη σοφία). 151
d) Ἀληθεύειν as ground of the question of μὴ ὄν (= ψεῦδος). 152
§ 32. Continuation: The idea of first philosophy in Aristotle. 153
a) First philosophy as ontology (ὂν ᾗ ὄν) and as theology. Explication of this duality on the basis of the Greek understanding of Being (= presence). 153
b) Λόγος as guideline for the research into Being carried out by σοφία. Explication of the guiding function of λόγος on the basis of the Greek understanding of Being. 155


Plato's Research into Being
Interpretation of the

Preliminary Remarks

§ 33. The meaning of the preceding preparation: the acquisition of the ground for an understanding of the issues in a specific Greek dialogue. The insufficiencies of the preparation. 157
§ 34. Recapitulation: First characterization of sophistry. Delimitation of sophistry against dialectic and philosophy. The appreciation of the εὖ λέγειν: unconcern with substantive content versus concern with substantive content. 159
§ 35. Structure and articulation of the Sophist. 160
a) General characterization of the structure of the Sophist. The traditional division: introduction, shell, kernel. Acceptance and critique. 160
b) The articulation of the Sophist (according to H. Bonitz). 161


The Prelude to the Dialogue
(Sophist 216a-219a)

§ 36. First intimation of the theme and method of the dialogue. Introduction of the ξένος from Elea. The fundamental theses of Parmenides. Θεὸς ἐλεγκτικός? The divinity of philosophy. Theme of the dialogue: the philosopher. Method: διακρίνειν τὸ γένος. The ground of διακρίνειν: immediate self-showing (φάντασμα) and popular opinion: φιλόσοφοι = πολιτικοί-σοφισταί-μανικοί. 163
§ 37. More precision on the theme. Explication of the thematic object of a question in general: the distinction between the matter at issue (τί), the determination of the matter (γένος), and the designation of the matter (ὄνομα). Λόγος as the unitary field of the threefold distinction. Task: application of this distinction to three objects: σοφιτής—πολιτικός—φιλόσοφος. 170
§ 38. More precision on the method. 172
a) Λόγος as the method of the investigation. The type of λόγος: mixed form between dialogue and monological treatise. Introduction of Theaetetus as collocutor. Agreement about the initial theme: the sophist. Ground rule of the method: τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτο διὰ λόγων. The linking of substantive thinking and methodological thinking in Plato. 172
b) Elucidation of λόγος as a basic task of the Greeks. Domination of propositional logic over λόγος. 174
§ 39. The question of philosophy in the present age. Increasing difficulty with regard to Plato. The influence of Christianity and the Renaissance. The stifling of the idea of substantive research. "Prophetic" and "scientific" philosophy (K. Jaspers). The freedom of substantiveness 175
§ 40. Transition to the substantive issue: the choice of the exemplary object. The twofold criterion: 1.) simplicity 2.) analogy and richness of the ontological structures. The ἀσπαλιεθτής as exemplary object. 178


The Search for the λόγος of the Factual Existence of the Sophist
(Sophist 219a-237b)

Chapter One

An Example of the Method of Defining. The Definition of
the ἀσπαλιευτής. (219a-221c)

§ 41. The scope of the exemplary object (ἀσπαλιεθτής) and its method of treatment. The Sophist: not a "purely methodological dialogue." 181
§ 42. Τέχνη as the basic determination of the ἀσπαλιεθτής; its two εἴδη (ποιητική, κτητική). 182
a) Τέχνη as the basic determination of the ἀσπαλιεθτής. The ζήτημα πρῶτον (the phenomenon serving as point of departure) as "prepossession." Τέχνη: knowing-how to do something or other, δύναμις εἰς. Horizon: life, Dasein. 182
b) The first εἶδος of τέχνη: ποιητική. 184
α) Adducing the phenomena. Exposition of the one identical basic phenomenon: ἄγειν εἰς οὐσίαν. 184
β) Outlook: the meaning of Being for the Greeks. Being (οὐσία) = presence, to be available, to be pro-duced. Ἄγειν εἰς οὐσίαν = to pro-duce, ποιεῖν. Reading off the meaning of Being from the surrounding world. The natural ontology of Dasein. Ποίησις and οὐσία. 186
c) The second εἶδος of τέχνη: κτητική. 188
α) Adducing the phenomena. Exposition of the one identical basic phenomenon: κτῆσθαι (appropriating). The basic possibilities of appropriating : 1.) λόγος, 2.) πρᾶξις. 188
β) Outlook: the Greek understanding of λόγος. Λόγος as appropriation of the truth of beings. 190
γ) Ποίησις and κτῆσις as modes of commerce with the world. The structures of the commerce of Dasein with the world as the horizon for an interpretation. 191
§ 43. The determination of τέχνη κτητική. 192
a) The determination of κτῆσις in terms of its "how." The possible modes of appropriation. Seizing (χειροῦσθαι). Hunting (θηρευτική). 192
b) The determination of κτῆσις in terms of its "what." Living things. 194
c) Further determination of θηρευτική in terms of its "how." Summary: history of the provenance of the ἀσπαλιευτής. 196
§ 44. General characterization of the method. Dichotomy and diairesis as modes of δηλοῦν. The echo of the Platonic dichotomy in the ἄτομον εἶδος of Aristotle. Dichotomy and diairesis as Plato's way of treating beings and Being. 197

Chapter Two

The Definitions of the Sophist. Definitions 1-5. (221c-226a)

§ 45. Preliminary remarks. The difficulty of defining the sophist. The indeterminateness of the ζήτημα πρῶτον. The meaning of the definitions: the securing of the immediate aspects (φαντάσματα) of the sophist in the usual horizons. Actually not definitions but descriptions. Articulation of the definitions. 200
§ 46. The first definition of the sophist: hunter (221c-223b). Ζήτημα πρῶτον: τέχνη. The common course of the history of the origination of the sophist and of the ἀσπαλιευτής: τέχνη—κτῆσις—χειρωτική—θηρευτική Distinction with respect to the "what" of the θηρευτική: man. Factual comportment as the standard. Λόγος as the tool of the sophist. Rhetoric as horizon. Ἀρετή. Δοξοπαιδευτική. 202
§ 47. The second, third, and fourth definitions of the sophist: merchant (223b-224e). 206
a) The second definition. Retailer (223b-224d). Link to the first definition: ἀρετή, παιδεία. Κτητική—μεταβλητική—ἀγοραστική. Trading in λόγοι καὶ μαθήματα ἀρετῆς. Λόγος as the sophist's merchandise. 206
b) The third and fourth definitions. Shopkeeper (224d-e). The differentiation of the third definition (shopkeeper) according to the summary of the definitions (225e). Trading in: 1.) foreign or 2.) self-produced λόγοι. Increasing concentration of the definitions of the sophist on λόγος. 209
§ 48. The fifth definition of the sophist. Disputer (224e-226a). Orientation toward the horizons of the definition of the ἀσπαλιεθτής: κτητική—χειρωτική—ἀγωνιστική. Battle by means of λόγοι. Λόγος as the basic phenomenon of the definitions of the sophist; recapitulation. Ἀντιλογική, ἐριστική. The babbler (Theophrastus, Characters, 3). 210
§ 49. Transition to the further task: orientation with regard to Plato's position on λόγος by means of a clarification of his position on rhetoric. 212

Chapter Three

Orientation regarding Plato's Position on λόγος.
Plato's Position on Rhetoric.
Interpretation of the

§ 50. Introductory remarks. 214
a) Plato's ambiguous attitude toward rhetoric. General characterization. Rhetoric before Plato: πειηοῦς δημιουργός. Plato's attitude: negative in the Gorgias, positive in the Phaedrus. 214
b) The controversial character of the Phaedrus. Schleiermacher's theses about the Phaedrus and about Plato in general. The beginnings of historiographical-critical research into Plato. Dilthey and Schleiermacher. 215
§ 51. General characterization of the Phaedrus. 218
a) The putative disparity and the central theme of the Phaedrus: human Dasein itself in its relation to Being (love, beauty, the soul, speech). 218
b) General characterization of the first part of the Phaedrus. The preeminent significance of λόγος for the central theme of the Phaedrus. Socrates' love for λόγος (or for speaking) as a passion for self-knowledge. 219
c) General characterization of the second part of the Phaedrus. Its articulation into three moments (Rhetoric and truth. Truth and dialectic. Rhetoric as ψυχαγωγία). Plato' s positive evaluation of λόγος. Outlook: his skepticism with regard to λόγος, as "writing." 221
§ 52. Recollection of the sense of the interpretation of the Phaedrus in connection with that of the Sophist. Gaining a fundamental grasp of the meaning of λόγος as the field of scientific philosophy for the Greeks. Transition to the interpretation of the second part of the Phaedrus. 222
§ 53. The foundation of rhetoric as a positive possibility of human Dasein (Phaedrus, second part, 259e-274a). 224
a) The seeing of the truth as a condition of the possibility of rhetoric. 224
α) The question of the condition of the possibility of rhetoric. Εἰδέναι τὸ ἀληθές. Δόξαντα πλήθει. Ὀρθότης. 224
β) The essence of the ἀπάτη. General characterization. Its structure: ὁμοιοῦν. Its object: the "essential" things. 225
b) The seeing of the truth by means of dialectic. General characterization of dialectic. The two component parts of dialectic: συναγωγή and διαίρεσις. Συναγωγή as ἀνάμνησις;. Dialectic as a condition of the possibility of rhetoric. 228
c) Rhetoric as ψυχαγωγία. The conditions of its possibility and its justification. Summary: dialectic as the ground of rhetoric. 232
d) Plato and Aristotle on rhetoric. 233
§ 54. Plato's skepticism with regard to λόγος (Phaedrus, second part, 274b-279c). 235
a) The ontological possibility of free-floating λόγος. 235
b) The critique of writing. The legend of Theuth. Writing as debilitation of μνήμη. Λήθη. Σοφίας δόξα. Writing as mere impetus (ὐπόμνησις). The silence and defenselessness of the written λόγος. Genuine and written λόγος. The written λόγος as εἴδωλον. 235
c) Plato's position on λόγος in the "Seventh Letter." 239
d) The correct condition of the ψυχή as presupposition for genuine λόγος (διαλέγεσθαι). 240
§ 55. Transition: Dialectic in the Phaedrus and in the Sophist. 241
a) Result and limits of the characterization of dialectic in the Phaedrus. Plato and Aristotle on dialectic and rhetoric. 241
b) The motive for the further development of dialectic in the Sophist: the differentiation of the "object" of dialectic (beings—Being and ontological structure). 243

Chapter Four

The Definitions of the Sophist. Sixth and Seventh Definitions. (226a-236c)

§ 56. The sixth definition of the sophist. Refuter (226a-231c). 245
a) The question of the classification of the sixth definition. The concrete structure of the definitions. The sixth definition as a union of the fifth and the seventh definitions (ἀντίλογος). 245
b) Formal depiction of the way of the sixth definition. Diairesis. To take apart (διαίρεσις)-to set in relief (διάκρισις)—to extract—to render free, to purify (κάθαρσις). Preview of the genuine object of κάθαρσις: ἄγνοια. Κάθαρσις as ἔλεγχος. 247
c) Detailed depiction of the path of the sixth diairesis. 249
α) The differentiation of the κάθαρσεις with respect to the sophist's object (ψυχή). Κάθαρσις of the body and κάθαρσις of the ψυχή. Remark on dialectic. Κάθαρσις as ἐκβολὴ τῆς κακίας. 249
β) The determination of the κακία in the ψυχή, with the flesh as guiding line. 252
αα) The κακία of the flesh. Sickness and ugliness. Sickness: στάσις (insurrection). Ugliness: ἀμετρία, δυσειδές (deformity). Directedness-toward as condition of the possibility of the ἀμετρία of a comportment: general structural analysis. 252
ββ) The ἀμετρία in the ψυχή: ἄγνοια. Structural analysis of νοεῖν. The orientation (ὁρμή) of νοεῖν toward the ἀληθές. Ἄγνοια as ugliness in the ψυχή. Ἀληθεύειν as καλόν. 254
γγ) Directedness-toward as an original structure of Dasein as Being-in (Being-in-a-world). The Greek discovery of Beingin. The Greek interpretation of existence as illuminated from the "world." The darkness of the history of anthropological questioning (Dilthey). The ontology of Dasein as presupposition for an insight into this questioning. 255
γ) The determination of the κάθαρσεις of ἄγνοια. 257
αα) The κάθαρσις of ἄγνοια as διδασκαλική. 257
ββ) Further determination of ἄγνοια. Ἄγνοια as ἀμαθία, as presumptive knowledge and infatuation, as the actual κακία in the ψυχή. 257
γγ) Further determination of διδασκαλική as κάθαρσις of ἄγνοια. Not a communication of knowledge but a liberation toward ἀληθεύειν: παιδεία. λόγος as essential element of παιδεία. Its types: νουθετητική (admonition) and elenchtics. Rejection of νουθετητική. 259
δδ) The κάθαρσις of the ἄγνοια by ἔλεγχος. The procedure of ἔλεγχος. Setting the δόξαι against each other through the συνάγειν εἰς ἕν. Rejection of the purported discovery of the principle of contradiction. Its discovery in Aristotle. The ἐκβολή of δόξα as μεγίστη τῶν καθάρσεων. The liberation of Dasein toward ἀληθεύειν. 260
d) The result of the sixth diairesis: philosophy as "legitimate sophistry." The similarity between philosophy and sophistry. The aporia in relation to the sophist. 263
§ 57. Summary of the previous six definitions. The unitary basic structure: the sophist as ἀντιλογικός (231d-232e). 264
§ 58. The seventh definition of the sophist. Semblant artist (232b-236c). 265
a) The "object" of sophistical λόγος: τὰ πάντα. 265
α) Enumeration of the individual "objects" of sophistical λόγος. The orientation of Greek-Platonic philosophy. 265
β) Explication of the τέχνη σοφιστική as a mode of commerce with things. The structural moments of this commerce (the objects—the mode—the end, εἰς ὄ). The primacy of the εἰς ὄ in Plato. 267
γ) First intimation of the ontological problematic of the τέχνη σοφιστική the Being of non-beings. 269
b) Concrete demonstration of the factual Being of the τέχνη σοφιστική from the example of τέχνη μιμητική. 269
α) The factual Being of the τέχνη σοφιστική as ἐπιστήμη δοξαστική. 269
β) Τέχνη μιμητική as ποιεῖν δοκεῖν. Τέχνη σοφιστική as ποιεῖν δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι. 270
γ) The classification of the sophistical λόγος within ποίησις. Τέχνη σοφιστική as εἰδωλοπιική. The sophist as μιμητής. Τέχνη σοφιστική as τέχνη μιμητική. The one identical basic meaning of ποιεῖν, μιμεῖσθαι, λέγειν: to let be seen. The sense of Being for the Greeks: presence. 272
c) Sharpened demonstration of the factual Being of the τέχνη σοφιστική out of the horizon of τέχνη μιμητική. 275
α) The two types of τέχνη μιμητική: εἰκαστική and φανταστική. The two types of εἴδωλον: εἰκών and φάντασμα. The impossibility of clarifying the phenomenon of knowledge through the phenomenon of the image. Husserl's elucidation of the image. 275
β) The relation between the image (εἴδωλον) and the imaged (ὄν) in εἰκαστική and φανταστική. The determination of both types of εἴδωλον: εἰκών and φάντασμα. The enhancement of non-being in φανταστική. The indisputability of the Being of non-beings. 277
γ) The complete aporia of grasping the sophist. The sophist's hiding in the darkness of μὴ ὄν. The further task: the discovery of the εἶδος of μὴ ὄν. 279


Ontological Discussion
The Being of Non-beings
(Sophist 236e-264b)


§ 59. Exposition of the ontological problematic. 281
a) Summary of the result of the seventh definition of the sophist. The contradictoriness of ψευδὴς λόγος. 281
b) Excursus: δόξα and λόγος. Δόξα as a mode of λόγος, i.e., of διάνοια. 282
c) The ontological possibility of ψευδὴς λόγος: the Being of non-beings. 284
§ 60. The relation of philosophy to the tradition. 284
a) Conclusive establishment of the meaning of the "definitions" of the sophist: compulsion toward research into the matters themselves. The repudiation of the dogmatic tradition (Parmenides). 284
b) The relation of contemporary philosophy to the tradition. The "destruction" of the dogmatic tradition. The appropriation of the past research into the matters themselves. 286

Chapter One

Difficulties in the Concept of Non-beings (237a-242b)

§ 61. Examination of the principle of Parmenides. The unutterability of μὴ ὄν. 287
a) First exhibition of the difficulties of the λέγειν of μὴ ὄν. The fundamental contradiction between μὴ ὄν and λέγειν as λέγειν τί. 287
b) Continuation of the difficulties in the λέγειν of μὴ ὄν. Further determination of the structure of what is meant in λέγειν. Ἀριθμός and ὄν. Further determination of the conflict between μὴ ὄν and λέγειν. Intentionality as basic structure of λέγειν. 290
§ 62. Difficulties in the concept of εἴδωλον. 294
a) The essential determination of the εἴδωλον. The shaking of the rigid sense of Being in Parmenides by means of the phenomena of the εἴδωλον and ψεῦδος: the συμπλοκή of μὴ ὄν and ὄν in the sense of the εἶναι πως. Outlook: the κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν as the possibility of this συμπλοκή. 294
b) Determination of the proper task: the revision of the principle of Parmenides. The modification of the meaning of Being. 299

Chapter Two

Difficulties in the Concept of Beings. The Discussion of the Ancient and Contemporary Doctrines of ὄν (242b-250e)


§ 63. The point of departure for the solution of the task: the discussion of the ancient and contemporary doctrines of ὄν. 301
a) General characterization of Plato's and Aristotle's confrontation with the "ancients." Aristotle's solidification of the concept of ἀρχή. The elaboration of the "milieu" (λόγος) as the center of the development of Greek ontology. 301
b) The articulation of the discussion of the ancient and contemporary doctrines of ὄν. 304

I. The Discussion of the Ancient Doctrines of ὄν (242c-245c)

§ 64. General characterization of the first ontological attempts (242c-243c). Sketch of the theses about ὄν. Μύθος διηγεῖσθαι. Predelineation of Plato's procedure: elevation into the ontological dimension. 305
§ 65. The discussion of the thesis of the multiplicity of ὄν (243d-44b). Uncovering of εἶναι as unfinished task. Critique of today's "ontological" attempts: the forgetting of the question of the meaning of Being. Toward the elaboration of this question on the ground of a hermeneutic of Dasein. 308
§ 66. The discussion of the thesis of the unity of ὄν (244b-245a). 311
a) The discussion of ὄν as ἕν. The discrepancy between the meaning of the thesis and its linguistic expression. Ὑπόθεσις and "hypothesis." 311
b) The discussion of ὄν as ὄλον. The difference between the ἕν as ὄλον and the ἕν ἀληθῶς. Consequences for ὄν as ὄλον; its untenability. 315
c) Fundamental unclarities. 317

II. The Discussion of the Contemporary Doctrines of ὄν.
The γιγαντομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας (246a-250e).

§ 67. General characterization of the contemporary doctrines of ὄν (246a-250e). First thesis: οὐσία = σῶμα. Second thesis: οὐσία = εἶδος. The proper task of the γιγαντομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας: the disclosure of the beings corresponding to the guiding sense of Being. Being = presence. How the beings are encountered: 1.) σῶμα: αἴσθησις, 2.) εἶδος: νοεῖν, λόγος. 321
§ 68. The discussion of the thesis οὐσία = σῶμα (246e-248a). 325
a) Exhibition of the two kinds of beings: ὁρατόν and ἀόρατον. Εἶναι as συμφυὲς γεγονός. 325
b) The determination of εἶναι as δύναμις εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν. 328
§ 69. The discussion of the thesis: οὐσία = εἶδος (248a-249b). 330
a) The interpretation of the phenomenon of knowledge through the concept of the κοινωνία. 330
α) Knowledge as κοινωνία of the ψυχή with οὐσία (εἶδος). 330
β) The explication of the concept of κοινωνία by means of the concept of the δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ τοῦ πάσχειν. Being = δύναμις κοινωνίας. Recapitulation of the previous formulations. 331
b) The co-presence of movement in οὐσία. 332
α) Being-known as the πάθος of οὐσία. 332
β) The παρουσία of φρόνησις, νοῦς, ζωή, and κίνησις in the παντελῶς ὄν. 333
c) The question of Plato's confrontation with the young Aristotle. 334
α) The Aristotelian moments in Plato's ontological research: the σώματα as ground; the inclusion of δύναμις. 334
β) Plato's own solution. Presence as the basic meaning of Being in the two preceding positions. Plato's concept of Being: παρουσία δυνάμεως κοινωνίας. 336

III. The Discussion of the Sun-unary of the Theses about ὄν (249b-251a).

§ 70. The summary of the theses about ὄν with regard to the phenomenon of knowledge. The Being of κίνησις and στάσις as condition of the Being of knowledge. 337
§ 71. The discussion of the thesis: κίνησις and στάσις = ὄν. 339
a) Characterization of the situation. Reversion to the position of the ancient thesis: ὄν = δύο. Ἄγνοια ἡ πλείστη. 339
b) The solution of the difficulty by means of the concept of the δύναμις κοινωνίας. 339
α) The avoidance of the coincidence of κίνησις and στάσις by means of the τρίτον λέγειν of ὄν. 339
β) The more precise determination of the structure of συναγωγή. Συλλαβεῖν and ἀπιδεῖν as structural moments of συναγωγή. The κοινωνία of ὄν with κίνησις and στάσις. 341
γ) The cognition of the apriori (= essential cognition) in Plato. Critique of the Kantianizing misinterpretations. On the genesis of Neoplatonism: ὄν as τρίτον in the Sophist and the ἐπέκεινα of Neoplatonism. 342
c) The heightening of the difficulty of the elucidation of ὄν through the positing of ὄν as τρίτον. The similarity of the difficulty in relation to ὄν and in relation to μὴ ὄν. On the question of the interpretation of the transition. 343

Chapter Three

The Positive Resolution of the Problem by Means of the κοινωνία τῶν γενῶν (251a-264c)

§ 72. The question of the unity of the many (κοινωνία) in λόγος (251a-251c). 346
§ 73. Excursus: The "logic" of the Megarians and Antisthenes (according to Aristotle). 348
a) Antisthenes' interpretation of λόγος. Λόγος as simple φάσις; the denial of ἀντίλογος. 348
b) Λόγος ψευδής in Aristotle. Λόγος ψευδής as "deception," "distortion." The distinction between two forms of λόγος in Aristotle: λόγος ὡς εἰς and λόγος ὡς πολλοί. The synthetic structure of λόγος as a condition of the possibility of λόγος ψευδής. Antisthenes' denial of λόγος ψευδής. 349
c) Prospect: the synthetic structure of λόγος in Plato. The double συμπλοκή. 349
d) The positive meaning of Antisthenes' doctrine of λόγος for Aristotle. Aristotle's discovery of the λόγος καθ᾽ αὐτό. The discovery of the γένος; and its presupposition. 352
§ 74. The discussion of the fundamental possibilities of κοινωνία within beings (251d-252e). 354
a) Introductory remarks. The further articulation of the Sophist. Determination of the "pre-possession." The κοινωνία within beings as the foundation for dialectic. Exposition of the fundamental possibilities of κοινωνία. 354
b) The carrying out of the discussion. 355
α) First thesis: the exclusion of every κοινωνία whatsoever. The untenability of this position. The self-refutation of the Antisthenians. 355
β) Second thesis: unrestricted κοινωνία. Its untenability. Κίνησις and στάσις as ἐναντιώτατα. 356
γ) Third thesis: conditioned κοινωνία. Its recognition as the only tenable thesis. The preservation of knowledge. 357
§ 75. Further clarification of the conditioned κοινωνία of beings (253a-253b). 358
a) Illustration of the conditioned κοινωνία by means of letters. The special position of the vowels as an illustration of the special position of the fundamental determinations of beings: δεσμὸς διὰ πάντων. 358
b) Excursus: further clarification of the universal presence of the fundamental determinations of beings. The analogy of the dovecote in Plato's Theaetetus. 359
c) The κοινωνία of letters and sounds as "object" of a τέχνη. Reference to a corresponding τέχνη regarding the conditioned κοινωνία of beings. 360
§ 76. The idea of dialectic (253b-254b). 361
a) First characterization of dialectic. Dialectic as πορεύεσθαι διὰ τῶν λόγων. Γένος and εἶδος. The disclosure of the history of the provenance of "concrete" beings as the task of dialectic. The five principal moments of dialectic. Συναγωγή and διαίρεσις. Dialectic as uniquely free science, i.e., as philosophy 361
b) The second and third characterizations of dialectic. Ἔτερον and ταὐτόν as guiding concepts of dialectic. The obscurity of the third characterization. 365
c) Λόγος as mode of access to beings. Distinctions in the meaning of "λόγος." Conclusion of the third characterization of dialectic. 366
d) Dialectic as a matter for the philosopher. The dwelling place of the philosopher and that of the sophist: the clarity of Being and the obscurity of non-being. The precedence accorded the thematic clarification of the sophist. 367
e) The result of the previous characterization of dialectic. The essential moments and basic presupposition of dialectic. 368
§ 77. The fundamental consideration of dialectic (254b-257a). The dialectic of the μέλιστα γένη. 369
a) Introductory remarks. The ground, theme, and intention of the ensuing dialectical analysis. 369
b) The five μέλιστα γένη: κίνησις—στάσις—ὄν—ταὐτόν—ἔτερον. Exposition of their autonomy. 371
α) The pregivenness of κίνησις—στάσις—ὄν. Their relationship 371
β) Ταὐτόν and ἔτερον as themes of the further investigation. Determination of the task and anticipation of the result. 372
γ) The autonomy of ταὐτόν and ἔτερον over and against κίνησις and στάσις. 375
δ) The autonomy of ταὐτόν and ἔτερον over and against ὄν. Ταὐτόν and ὄν. Ἔτερον and ὄν. The disparity between ὄν and ἔτερον. The πρὸς τι as founding character of the ἔτερον. Results and further task. 375
c) The δύναμις κοινωωίας of the ἔτερον. 379
α) The pervasive presence of the ἔτερον in the realm of the five μέλιστα γένη. Exemplified in κίνησις. 379
αα) Point of departure: taking up again the relation between κίνησις—στάσις—ὄν—ταὐτόν. 380
ββ) First stage: κίνησις and ταὐτόν 380
γγ) Second stage: κίνησις and στάσις. 381
δδ) Third stage: κίνησις and ἔτερον. 383
εε) Fourth stage: κίνησις and ὄν. The being-other of κίνησις as non-being. 383
β) The universal presence of the ἔτερον in all ὄντα in general. The universal presence of non-being. 385
§ 78. The conceptual elucidation of the structure of the ἔτερον. The determination of the concept of μὴ ὄν (257b-259d). 386
a) The πρὸς τι as the fundamental structure of the ἔτερον. The character of the "not" as disclosing the matters themselves. 386
α) The distinction between two modes of "not": ἐναντίον and ἔτερον (empty "opposite" and substantive other). 386
β) The "not" in λόγος. Negation as letting be seen. The positive understanding of negation in phenomenology. 387
b) More precise grasp of the structure of the ἔτερον: the clarification of the ἔτερον as ἀντίθεσις. Μὴ ὄν as οὐσία. 389
α) Thε concretion of the idea of the ἔτερον as πρὸς τι. Counter-part (μόριον) and oppositε (ἀντίθεσις). 389
β) The structure of μὴ ὄν as ἀντίθεσις. The substantive content of μὴ ὄν. Its full dignity of Being (οὐσία). Μὴ ὄν as autonomous εἶδος within the five μέγιστα γένη. 391
γ) Plato' s substantive advance over Parmenides' doctrine of μὴ ὄν. Ἀντίθεσις and ἐναντίωσις. 393
c) Μὴ ὄν qua ἔτερον as ground of the possibility of dialectic. Fourth characterization of dialectic. 393
d) Excursus: the "theory" of the "not" in Plato and Aristotle. The "not" in Parmenides, Antisthenes, and Plato (Republic, Symposium, Sophist). The overcoming of Antisthenes' tautological logic. Dialectical logic. Aristotle's theory of opposition. Toward the further articulation of the Sophist. 394
§ 79. Transition from the fundamental dialectical consideration to the analysis of λόγος (259e-261c). The question of the meaning of the fundamental dialectical consideration. 397
a) Exhibition of the necessity of the analysis of λόγος. The problematic character of the συμπλοκή of ὄν and μὴ ὄν with respect to λόγος. 397
b) Λόγος (or ψυχή) and λόγος ψευδής as central themes of the fundamental dialectical consideration. The κοινωνία of the εἴδη as condition of the possibility of λόγος in general. Κίνησις and στάσις as basic phenomena in the cognition of beings. The συμπλοκή between κίνησις and ἔτερον as predelineation of λόγος ψευδής. The Being of ψεῦδος as ontological foundation of the phenomena of falsity. 399
§ 80. The analysis of λόγος (261c-263d). 402
a) Exposition of the problem. Articulation of the analysis of λόγος into three stages 402
b) First stage: the exhibition of the onomatic and delotic basic structure of λέγειν. 404
α) The point of departure: ὄνόματα as the most immediate mode of encountering λέγειν. The phenomenal content of λέγειν in Plato: ὄνόματα—πράγματα—εἴδη—εἴδη as ἐπιστη τά. The connection between ὄνόματα and εἴδη by means of δηλοῦν. The recourse to Being-in-the-world as the task of a "phenomenological" interpretation of Plato's analysis of λόγος. 404
β) The κοινωνία of the ὄνόματα in λόγος. 407
αα) Δηλοῦν as criterion of the κοινωνία of ὃνόματα in λόγος. Rejection of the interpretation of ὄνόματα as signs. The essence of ὄνόματα (in the general sense) as δηλώματα. 407
ββ) The basic distinction within ὃνόματα in general between ὄνομα (in the stricter sense) and ῥῆμα. The δηλούμενον as the point of departure for the acquisition of this distinction. Ὄνομα = δήλωμα of the πράγμα; ῥῆμα = δήλωμα of πρᾶξις. Plato's determination of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα as preparation for Aristotle's determination of them. "Noun." "Verb." 409
γγ) The συμπλοκή of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα as an essential condition of the κοινωνία of ὄνόματα in λόγος. Δηλοῦν as the primary phenomenon within the structure of language and as the constitutive determination of Dasein: Being-in. Λόγος σμικρότατος (the "proposition"). Naming and saying. Summary of the first stage. 410
c) Second stage: the elaboration of the structure of the λεγόμενον qua λεγόμενον (= qua λεγόμενον). 413
α) The basic determination of λόγος: λόγος = λόγος τινός. Its rediscovery in Husserl: "intentionality." 413
β) The moments of the articulation of the τί as the τινός of λέγειν: 1.) "about which" (περί οὐ), 2.) "as-which" (ὄτου), 3.) "of which. " The structure of the τί as λεγόμενον: something as something. Distinction between three modes of κοινωνία in λόγος. 414
d) Third stage: the analysis of λόγος with respect to δηλοῦν. 416
α) The basic determination of λόγος qua λόγος τινός as the fundamental condition of deceptive λόγος. The ποιόν (ἀληθές or ψεῦδος) as a necessary character of λόγος. 416
β) Plato's dialectical interpretation of ψεῦδος and ἀληθές. The κοινωνία of ὄν (qua λεγόμενον) with ταὐτόν and ἔτερον as ground of the possibility of λόγος ἀληθές or λόγος ψεῦδος. The fourth κοινωνία in λόγος. 417
γ) Summary of the result of the analysis of λόγος. Λόγος as σύνθεσις. The fourfold κοινωνία in λόγος. 419
§ 81. The analysis of δόξα and φαντασία (263d-264d). The clarification of the τέχνη σοφιστική as τέχνη δοξαστική and τέχνη φανταστική through the proof of the possible conjunction of δόξα and φαντασία with ψεῦδος. Διάνοια, δόξα, and φαντασία as modes of λέγειν; their possible conjunction with the ἔτερον (i.e., μὴ ὄν or ψεῦδος). 420


From Heidegger's Manuscript
(Remarks, Additions, Annotations to the Lectures)

I. Supplements to the Introductory Part 423
II. Supplements to the Transition 433
III. Supplements to the Main Part 441
From the Notes of Simon Moser 455
Transition to the Class of the 26th Session (February 1 0, 1 925) 455

Editor's Epilogue 457
Glossary of Greek Terms 467

Plato's Sophist (GA 19) [GA App] {Sofist App}