precedented in the event—unprecedented as emergence of nothingness and decay into nullity.
224
The German ἄτολμος [“uncourageous”] (cf. p. 85).
That is to be said precisely of the Germans, because the acceptance of the distant injunction of the beginning awaits them alone.
The protracted impotence for insertion into the availability.
This impotence can be seen:
1.) in the groundless impatience with regard to all finding the way back to an essential growth;
2.) in the measureless dissolution of all actual questioning into one or several “psychologically” explainable and “historiologically” deducible views;
3.) in the unanimous diminution of every approach to the building up of the magnitude of the human world;
4.) in the stealing away from the breadth and depth of every world-affliction;
5.) in the unruliness of the prattling on and on about things from which the prattlers have in advance been closed off.
ἄτολμος: without the force to involve oneself in the ineluctability of the distant injunction of the happening of being {Seinsgeschehnisses}, without the great breadth to retain even the foreign and the hostile.
225
The beginning as distant injunction for the postulation of the question of being is to be developed quite differently than before. Thereby removed just as much from extrinsic “dismantling” as from “existence.”
The human being—i.e., our Dasein must be projected out from the distant injunction of the beginning and for that availability.
Out from and in the τόλμα [“courage”] of the disclosive questioning of the essence (cf. p. 140).
Out of the beginning effectuated in that way as its own, the essential truth of the beginning is to be brought to light; this was previously called the “ontological difference.” (Cf. □ and s.s. 32.25)
25. {Heidegger, “Ontologische Differenz und Unterschied,” in Zum Ereignis-Denken, GA73.2 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2013), 901ff.; Der Anfang, 31f.}