105
The forgottenness of being and the destruction of truth together effectuate the innocuousness—i.e., the blocking of what is uncanny—and bring about a sequestration from the “there.”
106
On the other hand, the statement: Da-sein essentially occurs as the contention of the event.
107
From the description of existentiell Dasein to the grounding leap into Da-sein: “metaphysics” of the (event); historical! But that means: futural.
“Philosophy” is always only somewhere or other, and at some moment or other, and for someone or other (the few, the unique), like lightning or earthquake. (Cf. p. 40, 82.)
108
Recollection.
The recollection of the first beginning.
The recollection into the steadfastness of Dasein (into the second beginning).
The second beginning, as the grounding leap into Da-sein, is “metaphysics”— in an essentially new—inceptual—sense. Beyond φύσις— that means: we can no longer begin with φύσις—ἀλήθεια—but are hurled beyond this beginning—cannot go back and must first seek and ground the open place as such—(φύσις, cf. s.s. 35,7 not to be misinterpreted as presence at hand—as was the danger in Being and Time, p. 8ff.)
No longer begin with φύσις and yet with ἀλήθεια!*
*But to do this “truly” as Da-sein; yet not as epistemology nor as “fundamental ontology.”
“Metaphysics” can commence only with the second beginning—it must do so and must as such precisely always recollectively internalize the first beginning (φύσις).
But the “title” itself says nothing. (Cf. above, p. 34, 46.)
7. {Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, GA40 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), 108ff., 131ff.}