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feeling, they think of abolishing philosophy; that is called “heroic worldview.”8
119
What matters is not primarily what serves (i.e., is useful to) the people, but what the people must serve, if the people is to be a people historically.
120
No science ever has even the possibility of demanding the exertion and rigor of knowledge, let alone of effectuating what arises in philosophy—supposing there is philosophy.
Yet philosophy cannot therefore be called “superscience,” for even then it remains measured according to science.
Essential knowledge must be determined and attuned out of the essence of truth. Rigor, however, serves only the exertion toward the leap into the origin—the strife of the “in-between.”
121
In the age of the “loudspeaker,” all that can still essentially be effective is the silence of the inconspicuous in the guise of that which “does not come into question.”
Those for whom all sorts of things do not come “into question” never do question at all.
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Da-sein as the most question-worthy.
φύσις and the genesis of the gods, this genesis [Entstehung] not meant as production—rather, to come into position [Stand] as to emerge and to rise up [Aufstehen]; not causal derivation; nor out of misconstrued “affects” and their impact.
8. {Cf. Johannes Mewaldt, “Heroische Weltanschauung der Hellenen,” Wiener Studien 54 (1936), 1–15.}