more originary truth, one that transforms human beings, i.e., displaces them for the first time into the spatio-temporal field of beyng.
6
Thinking—does it remain condemned to grasp itself and in that way take on the projective drive into beyng itself? Or is the thinking of the truth of beyng that creative thinking which no longer needs a concept of itself, because before it developed it already had to project this concept from itself? But is it not already on the point of doing so again through this question?
7
“Psychology” in the sense of the “projection” of everything onto “lived experience” has grasped contemporary humanity with such completeness that only | the step into the transformation of humanity can still suffice to survey the entire omnipotence of “lived experience.” The “biological” way of thinking not only fails to break this sovereignty of “psychology” but even strengthens it by making it cruder and all the more available to everyone. This way of thinking also shifts all “work” into the atmosphere of the exudation from peoples and personages. Every presupposition for the possibility of the effectuation of an actual work disappears thereby—for a work indeed precisely effectuates— if it is effective—a displacement into the wholly other space it itself first grounds. But all lived experience is antagonistic to such displacement and even to the claim in favor of it. “Lived experience” appeals tacitly to “the” certain “life,” the one that is certain of itself and of its incontestable measures and regions. And in relation to all this, what is more “actual” than such “life,” which today takes good care that people are enthralled by it? The exalting of “life” to “all-encompassing life” [“Allleben”] is at once arbitrary and thoughtless. Nietzsche shows how disastrous this exaltation can become, Nietzsche who is as far removed from biologism as | his biologically physiological way of thinking, in its manner of expression, seems to confirm the opposite.
8
All “meaning” has become meaningless—if “meaning” is supposed to refer to “Ideas,” “values,” or some such genuine or ungenuine Platonisms. Why? Because the foundation (all of Western metaphysics as such) of this way of thinking is unstable. Or was “meaning” indeed always already meaningless—inasmuch as the truth of the ἰδέα as the determination of the beingness of beings remained unquestioned? The meaninglessness