is that “technology” can never be mastered through the folkish-political [völkisch-politisch] worldview. This that in essence is already a slave can never become master.
Nevertheless, this birth of the new politics out of the essence of technology, insofar as we grasp these nexuses not chronologically-historiologically but in terms of the history of being (as arising out of the machinational distortion of the essence of being), is a necessary birth and therefore not a possible object of a short-sighted “opposition” assisted by appealing to the previous “worldviews” and to standpoints of faith. Necessary are only the concord of originary possibilities and the impetus to concomitantly creative meditation, which today, otherwise than ever before, can think only in terms of centuries. (Cf. p. 56f.)
88
Does a truth arise from the coupling of two errors? No. Then a third error? No. Instead, something much more dangerous, because more pertinacious, namely, the semblance of a truth and indeed mostly a semblance which cannot be surpassed with respect to self-evidence.
89
Why is now, and already earlier, every truth which is supposed to be a common possession becoming unexpectedly an untruth? Is it due only to humans, namely, their inability to seize the truth and adhere to it? Indeed it is not, for in the common seizing upon a “truth,” this “truth” would otherwise have had to come to light even more purely, whereas in the community each one already assists, and is supposed to assist others to, that which bears all.
Or is it due to the essence of truth, because truth is always also untruth, such that something individual does not remain equal to it and precisely then least of all when it is a matter of seizing its full essence (which includes its distorted essence)? The question above is therefore insufficiently posed, because by using the term “truth” it assumes there is and would be its pure “essence.”
But—according to what do we in general value the | “essence” of truth and the truth of the essence?
Whither must we and can we place ourselves in questioning, if we once radically distrust—not on “psychological” grounds, but on the ground of the history of being—the actually emerging immediate insight?