The references to the principle of reason yielded by our previous course of reflection place the principle within the horizon opened up by the thinking of Leibniz, from whom it received its basic contours. Ultimately we brought the ordinary and the strict formulations of the principle to their abbreviated forms: "nothing is without reason" and "nothing is without a why." A fragment from Angelus Silesius gave us the occasion to show that the principle of reason generally does not hold in the strict formulation. For contrary to the "nothing is without a why," the fragment says:
The rose is without why; it blooms because it blooms,
It pays no attention to itself, asks not whether it is seen.
Roughly put, the "without why" says that the rose has no grounds. Contrary to this, the "because" in the same verse says, roughly speaking, that the rose has a ground. According to this, something such as a rose can simultaneously have a ground and be without grounds. So in the preceding session we said more precisely that the rose is indeed without why, but-in view of the "because" -nevertheless not without grounds. From this we next established what the text says about the rose when we first listened to it: a "without why" and a "because." We will next clarify, in a general way, what is meant by the "why" and by the "because'' and do so without regarding the fragment of Angelus Silesius. The "why" and "because" speak of a relationship of our cognition to grounds, a relationship that at times varies. In the "why" we question, we pursue grounds. In the "because" we retrieve grounds in giving an answer. So it seems that we bring grounds into a closer relationship to us with the "because," while with the "why" we distance ourselves from grounds, so to speak. If we take a good look at it, the matter indeed is the reverse. With the "why" we pose a reason so that it stands to answer to us. On the other hand, with the "because'' we turn our cognition loose in the direction of grounds and the matter that
41