Lecture Six [89-90]

when, in hearing the unison of "is" and "reason" in the intonation of the principle of reason ''Nothing is without reason," we bring something obvious into view that is present in the content of the statement of the principle of reason. What do we bring into view when we think about the principle of reason in the tonality introduced here? "Nothing is. ..." What does "is" mean? From grammar we know that "is" belongs to the conjugations of the helping verb "to be". Yet it is not necessary to resort to grammar. The content of the sentence affords us plenty of information. "Nothing," that is, no being whatsoever "is—without reason." Even if it does so completely indeterminantly, the "is" always names the being of some being. So the principle of reason, which is offered as a statement about beings, says: to the being of beings there belongs something like ground/ reason. Consequently, the principle of reason proves to be not only a statement about beings; even more, what we bring into view is that the principle of reason speaks of the being of beings. What does the principle say? The principle of reason says: to being there belongs something like ground/reason. Being is akin to grounds, it is ground-like. The sentence ''Being is ground-like" speaks quite differently than the statement "being; have a reason." "Being is ground-like" thus in no way means "being has a ground"; rather, it says: being in itself essentially comes to be as grounding.[29] Of course the principle of reason does not say this explictly. The content of the principle one immediately perceives leaves unsaid what the principle of reason says. What[30] the principle of reason says does not come to language, namely, not to that language that corresponds to that about which the principle of reason speaks. The principle of reason is an uttering [Sagen] of being. It is this, but in a concealed manner. What remains concealed is not only what it says; what also remains concealed is that it speaks of being.