The Principle of Reason [177-178]

in Greek: τὸ αὐτό (ἔστιν) εἶναί τε καὶ λόγος-εἶναι and λόγος (are) the same. In fact one nowhere finds among the Greek thinkers a principle worded in this way. Nevertheless, it names the trait of the Geschick of being of Greek thinking, and this in a manner such that it points forward into the later epochs of the history of being.

In looking back on the question which we circumscribed more precisely above, we must now consider: to what extent does an affiliation with being, that means with εἶναι, speak in all that is said in the Greek word λόγος? In terms of the Latin esse and the German auxiliary verb sein [to be] , this Greek word means "coming to be present. "Explained in terms of its Greek sense, "being" means "to shine with and down here into that which is unconcealed, and thus, while shining, to last and abide. "

To what extent does being, thought in this way, belong together with Grund and ratio? As long as we leave the question in this form, it remains confused and deprives us of every clue to the answer. The confusion resolves itself if we ask to what extent does "to be," thought in a Greek manner as "coming to be present," belong together with λόγος? Put another way, to what extent does a belonging-together with being, thought in a Greek manner, speak in what the word λόγος names. To what extent "are" λόγος and "coming to be present" the same? What does λόγος mean?

Much will have been gained for the exacting treatment of this decisive and wide·ranging question if we no longer let what has come up on the path of this lecture slip from sight. What is this? A truly simple insight that we are wont to take too lightly because it is simple. What does this insight show us? It acquaints us with the following: "grounds" and "Reason" are the translations, which now means, the historical legacy of bifurcated ratio. Ratio is the translation, that now means, the historical legacy of λόγος. Because this is the case, we therefore may think λόγος neither in terms of our more recent representations of "grounds" and "Reason," nor even in the sense of the Roman ratio. How else are we to think it? Answer: in a Greek manner, in the sense of Greek thinking and speaking. This seems to be a plausible piece of advice, namely the sort of advice that is none, for what does it mean: "thinking and speaking in a Greek manner"? It means that what is Greek about the thinking and speaking we now undertake is determined precisely by λόγος and as λόγος. Therefore, we ought not convince ourselves that it is easy to think about the Greek word λόγος and what it says in a Greek manner, and that means, to think about it regardless of the representational thinking that is commonplace with us.

Difficult as the task seems to be, we must rise to the occasion, assuming that in the meantime we have found it necessary to listen to what the principle of reason genuinely says, that means, says in the other tonality, which means that in the meantime we have experienced the principle of reason addressing