but not sufficiently, grasped (see “On the Essence of Ground”); i.e., primarily as Being alongside, Being-with itself and Being toward itself—for-the-sake-of the there as the essence of truth, but for-the-sake-of [um-willen: as a matter of the will]); [By using the word um-willen, Heidegger is pointing out that the German word umwillen, normally translated as “for the sake of,” contains the word Wille, the will. -Tr.] it is not for-the-sake-of-itself nor is it even for-the-sake-of at all. The for-the-sake-of-itself arises from the existentiell approach—care—instead of from contestation. But the for-the-sake-of likewise arises from the decisive, not merely instructive, analysis of the world from the environing-world as an equipmental totality, yet this is likewise related to Dasein!; c.f., Dasein as the essence of the will. Not interpreting Dasein through and with the help of the for-the-sakeof, but rather the other way around—the for-the-sake-of as the will of essence both in and as Dasein (see “On the Essence of Ground” III!).
But all of this comes initially from approaching the Being-question as the understanding-of-Being-question and from the orientation toward the original condition—taking this to be time—the Temporality [Temporalität] of temporality [Zeitlichkeit] (see below).
Since οὐσία is temporal, then Being is taken altogether and as such out of an originary temporalness! [Zeithaftigkeit!] But temporalness out of temporality, and temporality out of the essence of Dasein—Dasein being identical to the human being. This mistake is explained by the interpretation of Being (temporal) and by the interpretation of the human being—care. Dasein, however, which is supposed to make this change, hangs between both and is not able to exercise its historical essence as the inception.
The emphasis on the temporalness of οὐσία (presence as the essence of the ὄν) is indeed justified and true, but from this it does not follow—and this is tacitly adhered to—that now time as such and on its own determines the essence of Being, not even if it is only asked in a transcendental way and not even if time here is more original.
This is an essential mistake, but on the other hand, it can only be eliminated by the essence of truth (ἀλήθεια) and by beginning the going-forth into Dasein in a different way from the ground up and, as a transition, by overcoming the Being-question.
What is mistaken is thus not that there is a subjective attitude—because this is on the whole and fundamentally overcome—; [176] the mistake, rather, is that it is only temporal in the essence of Being! Raising the temporal over against what came before is indeed essential, but this was done hastily, and with respect to what followed it was disastrous.
Thus, the question of Being and Time is not insufficient simply because it remains in Being and in wholeness, but rather also because Being and time are not enough!