6. but that in εἶναι—οὐσία qua παρουσία and ἀπουσία, something like presencing-towards [An-wesen] is revealed—“the present” and thus “time-liness”;
7. but that this timeliness remained unconsidered;
8. that “time” was itself thought much more out of εἶναι as an ὄν τί and a μὴ ὄν τί and could not get any help at all from the metaphysical concept of time.
9. In all of this it became ever clearer and more pressing that it was not any kind of forgetfulness in thinking or any kind of oversight or mistake that was decisive; rather, Being itself withholds “meaning” here and holds on to itself with it, as it were.
10. This holding-onto-itself of Being was thought as the “ground” of the oblivion of Being, and it was thought in connection with the Temporality of Being as the epochal, animated—perhaps denotatively, but not in substance—by Husserl’s term “epoché.” (With that term, Husserl understands a methodological attitude of transcendental-phenomenological analysis.) By the epochal, I understood a basic feature of Being itself, which was only to be understood historically. But in determining what is meant here by the historical, Dilthey also did not help; he was nonetheless brought in as help because he experienced historicality in a way that was distinct from transcendental phenomenology.
But it is now sheer nonsense to make a mess of everything by taking the whole other way of questioning and the whole other experience of Being and Time and, conversely, projecting it back into Dilthey’s life-philosophy.
In this way, Dilthey’s own place within the “philosophy” of the outgoing 19th Century is at best concealed and disfigured. Just take a look at Dilthey’s helplessness [222] with respect to “metaphysics” and “logic.”
The epochal and the temporal became the theme of Being and Time I. 3. But the transcendental-horizonal approach—although it was understood in terms of the ekstatically historical, as distinct from subjectivity—did not allow the epochal and temporal to speak purely in themselves through “time” from Being under the title: Time and Being.
The epochal—the withdrawal of the truth of Being; the truth-essay from 1930 tried again to say un-truth in its positive sense. But the relationship of the epochal as withdrawal and history (epoch-making) stayed out and so remained the reticent impetus for ever new approaches to thinking.
Only slowly, through detours and relapses, did the essential structure between the epochal, the primordially temporal, and the ekstatic come clearly into view as the fittingness of Being itself.
Therefore, it is also important to notice that everything that is presented here—arrayed, as it were, in numbers 1. 2. 3.—is, in the reality of the way, completely tangled; but it is also often far brighter and more farsighted than the saying of it was able to say in each case. Under no circumstances should one believe