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Remarks I-V [253–254]

from the perspective of metaphysics is, in its event-bound essence, the machination of the oblivion of the bearing-out; the genitives forms in this expression are genetic in the sense of the provenance arising from expropriation.14 They belong within the accumulated stocks [Vor-rätige] of the mysterious omen of the rite.

History of beyng is the history of the non-preservation of (difference) determining itself from the standpoint of beyng. This “is” the truth of being. History of beyng and the truth of beyng belong together. The truth of being initially means: the truth of the being of beings. Within that is thought: the truth of the difference between being and beings, i.e. the truth of the essence of difference. This is within beings as such and is the difference between beings and beings as such. Yet truth is preserving truth and preserving truth belongs in the essence of difference. “Difference,” however, is still the definition of the aforementioned that arises by clamoring onto the metaphysical representation of beings as such. What the aforementioned in its essence is and where it comes from, and that this essence moreover remains without guarantee and what this non-preservation rests in—all that is asked in the title “truth of being.” “Being” here already stands for “beyng.” That is the residual metaphysical name for the unexperienced essence of difference. Beyng is the machination of oblivion of the bearing-out. (Cf. above pp. 13, 55, 5).


Much is to be thought,

yet little to be said.

thus the slight grapples with the heights.


The unforgettable remains oblivion—namely for commemorative thinking that happened as event from the standpoint of the experience of oblivion of the preserving truth of the essence of beyng.


If the human only hears what he already thought, then he is deaf. He remains bereft of hearing and, in his incapacity for belonging, he stumbles into impropriety. What else could bring him to that point than to hear what beyng divines [Seyn seynt], not what the human opines [meint]? What else could bring him to that point but beyng it self, in whose essence the human belongs, without beyng thereby ever becoming human? Such an essence is beyng as the event (p. 104 ff.).



14. [Both occurrences of “of the” in the first clause are set in the genitive case in the original. —Trans.]


Remarks I-V (GA 97) by Martin Heidegger