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Remarks I-V [466–467]

What is thought—is what lets a thinking be thought back into the unthought.


Does thinking about thinking belong to thinking? The phrasing of this question already makes it suspicious. But if thinking is essentially reflection, thinking cannot elude itself and is not permitted to. But is thinking in its essence reflection? That is the case for representational thinking, which brings what is thought to itself. But how is it with commemorative thinking [An-denken]? It moves toward beyng and dissolves within it and in such a movement commemorative thinking is like the tree that, flourishing toward the light, shoots off its roots into the earth, but in such a way that it releases itself into the earth. What is thought with dignity must grow out of thinking in a corresponding manner.


The more essentially what is thought is thought, the more essentially it is already said. Thinking does not require artistry of language. pp. 3, 91, 112.


The personal god is a god for persons; hardly an absolute god, a very relative god. And what if personhood does not even constitute the essence of the human? How many kinds of persons are there? What do you want with your helpless flight into the thou that so brutally betrays your I-ness? Personality is too little for a god. —

Thinking never speaks to god, but it says the godhood of the gods.

We only think beyng when beyng has commemorated us with its preserving truth.

The solitude of the thinker is the world.


The experienced one easily distinguishes the language artist from one who is capable of saying. The latter says what has been thought. One sentence is sufficient for that, out of which the language artist extracts the content for multiple books.


Today the literature of novels, even the best ones of all the world languages, is based upon the ubiquity of the cinematic-psychotechnical representation of the world.


Thinkers who integrate the principle of their thinking into what they are thinking are never inceptual thinkers. They deceive themselves


Remarks I-V (GA 97) by Martin Heidegger